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The New Europe provides a fascinating testing ground for assumptions about the 
relative efficacy and feasibility of supranational vs. national-level decision-making 
arrangements. Neo-functionalist models tend to assume that the supranational level of EU 
decision-making is generally likely to yield more efficient, welfare-enhancing pareto-
optimal policy outcomes—to “upgrade the common interest”. Intergovernmental models 
suggest, on the other hand, that policy outcomes are a product of power struggles 
between states. Due to variation in relative power across states, there are likely to be both 
winners and losers in the policy-making process and integration outcomes. While all 
states are typically considered to be “net winners”, this does not preclude weaker states 
from being net losers in individual policy areas. Thus, while in the aggregate 
supranational-level decision-making may be preferable this does not preclude significant 
disadvantages in individual policy areas. In particular, latecomers not present at the 
inception of individual policy areas are most likely to be affected by this type of policy 
mismatch.  
This paper will analyze policy developments related to economic competitiveness 
and development interests in this general context and provide an analysis of the dominant 
forces that are likely to influence policy output in the New Europe. Given that—in the 
intergovernmental model at least—the interests of more powerful states are expected to 
supersede those of other states, it is important to analyze and understand the potential 
divergence of policy interests in the New Europe, as well as the strain this is likely to 
place on the supranational decision-making framework. Is policy cohesion possible, 
given the relative divergence of policy interests across the New and Old Member states? 
What kind of solutions will ultimately be proposed for regional development, corporate 
taxation, national economic competitiveness and what theories of European integration 
are best suited to explaining these policy outcomes? How sustainable is decision-making 
in the New Europe and how compatible are the interests of the New and Old Member 
states in the long term? 
Ample signs of the potential for emerging policy conflict precede the creation of 
the New Europe. Both France and Germany, with the recent addition of Poland, have 
protested against corporate taxation levels in some of the Central and East European 
economies. Central and East European countries were accused of “fiscal dumping”—i.e. 
exploiting EU structural and cohesion funds to make up for low rates of corporate 
taxation. French Minister of Finance, Nicholas Sarkozy even threatened to lobby for 
reduced Regional Development funding should the Central and East European countries 
allow their corporate taxation levels to fall below the European average (something 
Germany likewise supports). In the context of a meager allotment of structural and 
  1cohesion funds for the 2004-2006
1 period and even lower corporate tax rates in Ireland, 
this comes as a rude awakening to the New Member States. Moreover, this discussion 
compellingly exposes the importance of interests, states and groups within states to the 
newcomers in the European club. 
This paper argues that the New Europe is likely to experience a considerable 
divergence of policy interests as a result of the Eastern Enlargement. The more advanced 
EU Member states have a clear interest in reducing overall expenditures on the structural 
and cohesion funds and in the creation of a “level playing field”—reducing the role of 
state subsidies and raising regulatory standards in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, putting these on a par with Western levels. Less advanced states on the other 
hand are far more concerned with overall levels of economic competitiveness, sustainable 
economic development and the related impact of EU redistributional arrangements. Thus, 
the New Member States should have a much stronger interest in developing the EU’s 
fiscal tools for promoting economic growth and development (in particular the Structural 
and Cohesion Funds). Moreover, the New Member States may have an interest in 
maintaining many of the policies that the Old Member States would like to see 
eliminated—e.g. state subsidies and some forms of investment promotion incentives. The 
new range of median states—i.e. the former beneficiaries of EU structural and cohesion 
funds (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland)—fall in a somewhat dubious category. They 
can lobby hard to be included in future rounds of EU funding or—failing this—join the 
advanced states in lobbying for reduced expenditure and a level playing field. 
EU political bargaining during the enlargement process and even in the New 
Europe of 25 or 27 Member states is strongly weighted in favor of the larger and more 
advanced EU Member states. Moreover, the new Constitution does not result in any 
significant changes in this regard.
2 Thus the benefits resulting from the economic and 
political integration of Central and Eastern Europe will likely accrue primarily to the 
large and more advanced states, thereby potentially increasing the degree of political 
division in the New Europe. The potential for unanimity voting on multi-annual 
framework agreements—i.e. those agreements that affect the distribution of structural and 
cohesion funds—does make it possible for the New Member States to block agreement 
on proposals that fail to satisfy their interests. However, they are nonetheless in a weaker 
position vis-à-vis the larger Old Member states who can just as effectively block attempts 
to bargain significant changes to the current policy framework. Moreover, the “enhanced 
cooperation” clause in the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties and the new Constitution may 
ultimately remove any potential for the less advanced states to leverage significant 
concessions from the more advanced states. 
  The paper proceeds as follows: The first section discusses the competitiveness 
and economic development concerns of the Central and East European states in the larger 
context of the literature on the “developmental state”. The second section takes a look at 
some of the strategies pursued by the Central and East European states prior to EU 
membership and the third section assesses some of the potential weaknesses of current 
economic development in these states. The fourth section takes a look at the current and 
                                                 
1 See the discussion of the structural and cohesion funds in Ellison (2005). 
2 See for example the discussion of political bargaining in Ellison (2005). 
  2evolving EU policy framework. The fifth section looks at the future interests and 
concerns of the Central and East European states as they relate to the requirements of EU 
membership, the political bargaining process, and the potential compatibility or conflict 
of the EU framework with the goals of competitiveness and economic development. The 
final section concludes. 
 
In Search of Competitiveness 
  Economic competitiveness is the subject of much current debate both within and 
far beyond the borders of Europe. The advent of EU membership for 10 new less 
developed states has resulted in a renaissance of literature on economic competitiveness 
in Central and Eastern Europe—if indeed one can argue that interest in the subject ever 
declined.
3 Given that EU membership is likely to result in a further intensification of 
economic competition across the borders of the New Europe, concerns about the future 
prospects of the Central and East European states are at a new pitch. This fact has 
focused renewed attention on the various policy measures available in the EU that might 
assist these New Member states in promoting sustainable, long-term economic 
development. As such, the Lisbon strategy, the EU’s structural and cohesion funds, 
competition policy and rules regarding the use of state aids define a nexus of policy 
issues and concerns that are all highly salient and potentially heated topics of debate in 
the New Europe. 
What specific factors really drive economic competitiveness or the creation of 
dynamic economies is still a question of considerable academic and intellectual debate. 
For many, the answer to economic competitiveness lies in the complete elimination of 
barriers to trade and the establishment of free market entry.
4 For others, the key to 
economic competitiveness lies in the removal of the state from its involvement in the 
economy.
5 Others still have targeted inflation as the principal demon to be brought under 
control.
6 Yet again for others, economic competitiveness may well be a function of the 
degree to which governments are actually engaged in market-supporting activities, in 
particular the development of infrastructure and human capital. This approach likewise 
places a considerable emphasis on the importance of institutions.
7 The potential role of 
external increasing returns, economies of scale and economic geography likewise 
introduce a significant degree of uncertainty into the potential consequences of economic 
                                                 
3 Perusing through recent editions of economics journals in Hungary (e.g. Közgazdasági Szemle, 
Külgazdasági Szemle, the working papers of the Hungarian Institute for World Economics, etc.) one comes 
across a large number of articles that address this topic from multiple directions. Indeed this is nothing new. 
The development of economic competitiveness literature has been something of a cottage industry in 
Central and Eastern Europe ever since the initial stages of transition and has not begun to lose momentum 
with the advent of EU membership. 
4 See Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1996). 
5 See for example Krugman (1987). Both Tupy (2003) and Sachs and Warner (1996) argue, for example, 
that excessive state regulations lead to slow economic growth and that EU membership will ultimately 
mean some degree of re-regulation. 
6 See in particular Fischer, Sahay and Végh (1996) 
7 See for example Kolodko (2000?) and Rodrik (2002). 
  3integration—in particular for less developed economies and in the context of low 
European labor mobility.
8  
  In recent years, strong intellectual and ideological currents have reinforced and 
supported the shift away from state involvement in the economy and toward a more neo-
liberal agenda. Moreover, the phenomenon of globalization appears to have further 
strengthened the claim that states have no alternative but to pursue more neo-liberal 
agendas. There are essentially two core elements of the neo-liberal agenda. The first 
involves a narrow attack on the state and its interventionist role in economic affairs. The 
second involves a much broader attack on the fundamentals of the practice of import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) and promotes in its place what has come to be referred 
to as the “Washington Consensus”. This literature strongly advocates the role of the 
market at the expense of the state, economic openness and exposure to international 
competition. 
The now classic argument against government intervention has perhaps been most 
strongly articulated by Paul Krugman (1987). Krugman argues that governments are not 
able to make appropriate economic decisions and thus are best kept out of the economic 
arena. Private sector investments are preferable to public sector subsidies because private 
sector actors are subject to stricter budget constraints and are presumed to be more 
knowledgeable about the market. Moreover, Krugman emphasizes that politicians do not 
make strictly economic decisions, but rather make “political” decisions that may fail to 
recognize market constraints. Finally, Krugman points to the persistent problem of 
“capture” by private interests. Governments that attempt to prop up individual firms may 
find it politically and economically difficult to extricate themselves from their 
involvement in the market and thus are particularly susceptible to the rent-seeking 
activities of the business sector.
9
  The “Washington Consensus” is perhaps the most prototypical expression of what 
has come to be viewed as the neo-liberal agenda.
10 Controversial from the start, the 
Washington Consensus is a loose panoply of prescribed policy measures for states 
seeking to become more economically developed.
11 In general, the neo-liberal 
prescription has favored strong measures of fiscal prudence and the overall reduction of 
government expenditure, tax reform, competitive exchange rates, and secure property 
rights. The Washington Consensus eschews any form of market protectionism or state 
                                                 
8 See for example Martin (2003) on the issues of economic geography and labor mobility. See Ellison and 
Hussain (2003) on the issue of external increasing returns and uncertainty in the context of European 
integration. On the general concept of external increasing returns and economic geography see Krugman 
(1991). 
9 Hellman in particular provides an interesting discussion of the very real problems of capture in Central 
and East European economies, arguing that those countries that were more successful at introducing and 
then pursuing more thoroughgoing market reforms were also more successful at avoiding the costs of 
capture (1998). 
10 For Williamson’s original expression of the Washington Consensus, see Williamson (1990). While 
Williamson himself has explicitly contested the use of the term “neo-liberal agenda” (Williamson, 2000), 
this term seems particularly appropriate in contrast to the range of alternatives frequently proposed as 
alternatives to the Washington Consensus. 
11 One of the more potent criticisms is that offered by Rodrik (1996). But this policy approach continues to 
inspire strong criticism (see for example Beeson and Islam, 2004; Rodrik, 2002; and Kolodko, 2000?). 
  4involvement and promotes instead extensive price, trade and financial liberalization, 
thorough-going privatization of the economy and deregulation. Finally, the Washington 
Consensus supports the elimination of barriers to the free entry and exit of foreign 
capital. 
In response to the anti-statist and Washington Consensus views, a number of 
authors focus instead on the consequences of the withdrawal of the state from the realm 
from the role of economic management. Linda Weiss (2003) for example, argues that 
rather than constraining the behavior of states, globalization has in fact increased the 
likelihood of reliance on and potential importance of the state. Rodrik also has 
consistently criticized the notion that the removal of the state from the realm of economic 
management is a wise strategy. His early analysis of the Latin American and East Asian 
cases suggested that the role of government was in fact crucial to explaining the relative 
success of the East Asian Tigers (1996),
12 and more recently Rodrik has shifted his 
attention to the relative success of China and India, suggesting again that the role of the 
state is crucial in explaining overall economic performance (2002).  
While the notion of the “developmental state” may have lost some credibility in 
the late 90’s with the emergence of the Asian crisis, many authors still argue that the 
involvement of the state is crucial for achieving successful and sustainable economic 
development.
13 Thus much research has begun to (re-)focus attention on the value of 
institutions and state intervention, in particular in areas such as human capital and 
infrastructure. And international institutions such as the World Bank have more recently 
come back on board with much of this agenda.
14  
Shifting our attention to Central and Eastern Europe, several authors have 
suggested that the Central and East European countries have done better than countries 
further East (including Russia) precisely because they chose not to follow a strictly neo-
liberal approach to economic adjustment and renewal (Kolodko, 2000?, 1999; IMEPI-
RAN, 2001). In the case of the Central and East European states however, this overall 
picture is somewhat complicated by the fact that these countries stand before two major 
challenges. On the one hand, these states face the challenge of globalization as they move 
to market economies and greater economic openness. On the other hand, they likewise 
face the challenge of EU membership, competition with EU Member economies and 
adoption of the EU legislative framework. How these states have thus far dealt with these 
challenges, what factors best explain their relative degree of success, and how they are 
likely to be affected by EU membership is the subject of the remainder of this paper. 
While the turn to the market has certainly involved the state in different ways in the 
various countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the advent of EU membership appears 
more likely to constrain the role of the state in these countries.  
                                                 
12 In this regard, Rodrik builds upon a strong history of analysis of the East Asian case suggesting that state 
involvement played a strong role (see in particular Amsden, 1989 and Wade, 1990). 
13 See in particular Beeson and Islam (2004), Beeson (2003) and Weiss (2003).  
14 See in particular the interview with the World Bank’s Executive Director, Carole Brookins, Transition 
Newsletter, December, 2003-January, 2004: 1-3. To some extent, the World Bank has vacillated on these 
points. For example, the World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World likewise pointed 
to the potential importance of the role of the state, the usefulness of industrial policy, the development of 
infrastructure, good business-government relations and even subsidies (Beeson, 2003: 12). 
  5The dissenting literature on the Washington Consensus is disconcertingly vague 
on the precise form and shape of institutions that are likely to contribute to relative 
economic success. Both Rodrik (writing on China and India) and Kolodko (writing on 
Poland) suggest that institutions are the crucially neglected variable in development 
literature. But at the same time, they fail to specify much more precisely than this which 
institutions are the most important ones for successful economic development. This is—
in part at least—by design. Both of these authors suggest that universal models that can 
be applied in all cases do not really exist. Each of the countries they discuss has in fact 
pursued a model of development that is in some way attentive to local specificities and 
local institutional and power relations. The only strong commonality across 
developmental models these authors discuss lies in their insistence upon the importance 
of the role of the institutions of the state.  
In this regard, this paper will focus attention upon one specific role of the state in 
Central and East European countries in promoting economic growth and development in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, this paper will look at the role of investment 
promotion strategies and their ability to explain successful economic development—in 
particular in Hungary, upon which most of the following analysis is based. As will be 
discussed in further sections of the paper, this development strategy has important 
implications for the potential compatibility of Central and East European interests with 
the existing EU policy framework for economic development. 
 
Tools of the Past and Tools of the Future? 
The economic competitiveness strategies of the Central and East European 
countries have been quite varied. While the Hungarian case exhibits similarities with 
other countries in the region, it also exhibits many differences. For one, Hungary started 
quite early with a comparatively dynamic program for attracting FDI. The remaining 
Central and East European countries did not really initiate similar programs until much 
later. Moreover, while Hungary was the principal recipient of FDI in Central and Eastern 
Europe throughout most of the period from 1989 until about 1997, the remaining Central 
and East European countries only began to catch-up after 1997. In fact, as Sass notes, if 
we look at accumulated per capita stocks of FDI rather than flows, Hungary still remains 
the principal investment target in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, the relative degree 
of penetration of foreign capital in Hungary greatly surpasses that of other Central and 
East European countries (Hunya, 2004; Sass, 2003: 14). 
Throughout the 1990’s, the Central and East European countries were primarily 
focused on the shift from centrally planned command economies over to market 
economies and on the privatization of industry. Over this period, there have been a 
number of important successes. Hungary in particular has been remarkably successful at 
attracting foreign investment capital. The Hungarian economy is in fact almost entirely 
privatized, with little room left for further foreign investment in existing firms.
15 In fact, 
                                                 
15 Few state firms remain to be privatized. MALEV airlines is still 100% owned by the state—though there 
have been flirtations with various foreign investors (including Alitalia, Delta and Hainan Airlines). MVM, 
the firm that owns and manages the Hungarian electrical grid is likewise still 100% owned by the state. To 
date, some 99 or more firms remain to be sold by the Hungarian Privatization and State Holding Company 
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competitiveness and industrial policy strategies, it may be Hungary. As Hunya notes, the 
degree of foreign penetration of the Hungarian manufacturing sector is extensive. In 
2001, some 72.5% of output in the manufacturing sector in Hungary was attributable to 
foreign owned firms (2004: 15). Apart from 1995, 2001 was one of the biggest years for 
FDI flows into Hungary (Sass, 2004: 68). As Sass points out, 26,000 firms benefiting 
from foreign participation account for 80% of trade (2004: 64). As Szanyi notes, in the 
year 2000, foreign investment enterprises (FIE’s) also played a determinant role in net 
sales revenue (73.7%), value-added production (70%), and in manufacturing were 
responsible for 47.1% of employment (2003?: 9). 
At least one author has suggested that the corporate taxation policies of the New 
and Old Member States have begun to diverge. The author notes that from an average 2% 
difference in statutory corporate taxation rates in 1999 across the Old and New Member 
states, this difference increased to 6% in 2003. Moreover, many countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe envision still further reductions in the level of corporate taxation 
(UNECE, 2004a: 126, 128). Hungary, for example, further reduced its corporate income 
tax from 18% to 16% in 2004. Yet this image in fact papers over the much more generous 
taxation and investment incentive regimes available to foreign (and domestic) investors 
alike during large parts of the transition period. If these investment promotion schemes 
were more consistently included in the numbers above and over a longer time frame 
(from 1990 to the present), there would be considerably more convergence in the rates of 
corporate taxation across the Old and New Member States in the more recent period. 
The general issue of economic competitiveness has been dealt with in different 
ways by the Hungarian government. Tax benefits/holidays, monopoly concessions, as 
well as protective trade barriers
16 have all been introduced in order to encourage 
investment. A large number of the firms that have taken advantage of these concessions 
are foreign. This does not mean that no Hungarian firms have benefited from these 
arrangements. But foreign firms—due to the magnitude of the required investments—
have been among the principal beneficiaries. In Hungary, investment incentives were 
introduced even prior to the 1989 collapse of the East Bloc. As Éltetö notes, The 
XXIV/1988 law on Foreign Investment permitted foreign firms who invested in a select 
set of activities
17 to obtain a tax write-off of 100% for the first five years and 60% for the 
following five years. Tax exemptions of 60% and 40% respectively were possible for 
investments in other economic activities. In order to receive these tax reductions, the 
foreign investor share had to be at least 30% of a minimum capital stock totaling more 
                                                                                                                                                 
(APVrt). But most large state firms have been sold to foreign investors (for more up-to-date information, 
see the website of the APVrt: www.apvrt.hu). 
16 While I do not discuss these trade barriers in this paper, they have been discussed at greater length by 
Nagy (1994). The most interesting point Nagy makes in this context is that it was primarily the interests of 
large Western producers that were protected in the early European or Association Agreements, while the 
interests of domestic producers were largely ignored. This suggests that these concessions were largely 
made in order to attract foreign investment to the region. 
17 These activities were; ‘electronics, production of components for vehicles, production of machine tools, 
machinery components, production of pharmaceuticals, production of food-processing products, 
agricultural production, tourism, public telecommunication services and environmental protection products 
or equipment’ (Éltetö, 1998: 9). 
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earned from manufacturing. For smaller foreign investments, firms could deduct 20% of 
their corporate tax if the foreign investment share was at least 20% of the total capital 
stock or totaled more than 5 million Hungarian Forint (Éltetö, 1998: 9). 
Future modifications of the 1988 law impacted either the minimum capital stock 
thresholds or the allowable share of the tax write-offs. For example, as Éltetö notes, the 
1991 Act on Corporate Taxation increased the capital stock threshold for the 60%-40% 
tax reduction category to 50 million Hungarian Forint. Though these investment 
incentives were abolished in December 1993, from 1994 on, firms were permitted to 
apply for individual tax exemptions for foreign investments of “outstanding size and 
importance”. The 1995 amendment to the 1991 corporate tax law made all firms 
(domestic and foreign) eligible for 5 year tax exemptions of 50% for investments above 1 
billion Hungarian Forint leading in the first year to increases in exports of 600 million 
Hungarian Forint or 25% of previous export values. 5 year tax reductions of 100% were 
allowed in areas where the rate of unemployment exceeded 15%. Further tax preferences 
amounting to 6% of the total amount of investment were likewise available for 
investments in regions where unemployment exceeded 15% or in so-called 
“entrepreneurial zones”.
18
The 1996 LXXXI law introduced a number of new investment promotion 
incentives. For example, a 5 year 100% tax holiday was available for investments in less 
developed regions. Investments of more than 1 billion Hungarian Forint and leading to 
turnover worth at least 5% of the original investment value in the first year were eligible 
for a 5 year 50% tax reduction. A 10 year 100% tax reduction was available for 
investments in hotel facilities over 1 billion Hungarian Forint and leading to an increase 
in turnover of at least 25% or 600 million Hungarian Forint (Antalóczy and Sass, 2003: 
12; see also Szanyi, 2003: 15). 
The most liberal Hungarian corporate tax law went into effect on January 1
st, 
1998.
19 As noted above, firms investing more than 10 billion Forint (approx. $44.5 
million) and creating at least 500 new jobs were granted 10 year tax holidays. Firms 
investing in the less developed regions of Hungary were only required to invest 3 billion 
Forint (or approx. $13 million), employ at least 100 new workers and to increase turnover 
by 5% of the total investment cost (Éltetö, 1998: 9-10). According to representatives 
interviewed at the Hungarian Ministry of Finance, these tax holidays were valid for all of 
the Hungarian operations of the investing firm (not just the actual facility in which the 
firm had invested). While both domestic and foreign firms were eligible for these 
incentives, foreign firms were the principal beneficiaries since few domestic firms had 
sufficient investment resources. 
Further generous investment incentives were promoted with the innovation of so-
called “industrial parks”. The innovation of industrial parks in Hungary in fact predates 
                                                 
18 Ibid: 9-10; Magyarközlöny, 1995, No. 108: 6285-6. 
19 There is some confusion in the literature over the actual date on which this set of investment incentives 
was introduced. Only Éltetö accurately notes this law was introduced in 1998 (Éltetö, 1998: 9-10). Later 
work notes the date of 1996 (see for example, Szanyi, 2003: 15; and Antalóczy and Sass, 2003: 12). 
According to the Hungarian legislative texts, this amendment to the 1996 LXXXI law was introduced with 
the 1997 CVI law (CompLex, 2005). 
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predominantly financed through private foreign investments (AHIP, 1999: 97). From 
approximately 1996 on however, the Hungarian government—in part as an attempt to 
promote the development of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME’s)— 
progressively promoted the establishment of industrial parks. From 1996, Firms investing 
in such parks were eligible for a 5 year tax holiday (Éltetö, 1998: 11-12). In addition to 
tax holidays, the government dedicated 400 million Hungarian Forint to their 
development in 1996 and 800 million Hungarian Forint per year from 1997-1999 (AHIP, 
1999: 98). 
The Hungarian government likewise made available a number of additional 
investment funds to which firms could apply for grants, interest-free loans, interest 
subsidies and even direct state participation. For example, between 1991 and 1994 the 
Investment Incentive Fund distributed approximately 100 billion Hungarian Forint to 98 
different “high technology” projects—primarily the automotive industry and suppliers. 
This investment fund was replaced by a new fund in 1995, the Economic Development 
Fund and also the Allocation Fund (Éltetö, 1998: 10-11). According to Szanyi, the 
government also offered tax reductions in the first year for investments in R&D activities 
for up to 20% of the actual costs of the investment (2003: 16). 
  Hungary also pursued the creation of industrial free trade zones (IFTZ’s). These 
free trade zones were in fact first introduced in 1982, long prior to the collapse of the East 
Bloc. As Sass and Antalóczy both note, there were several advantages of setting up 
IFTZ’s.
20 First, companies could import equipment, machinery and other production 
inputs without having to pay import duties. Second, they could take advantage of local 
labor. The only restrictions on firms in IFTZ’s were that they produce for export. Over 
some 100 firms set up industrial free trade zones by January 2002.  
  Sass (2003) argues that the role of fiscal incentives was significant in Hungary 
and played an important role in attracting foreign capital. Other countries in the region—
in particular the Czech Republic and Poland—did not begin to attract comparable 
amounts of FDI until 1997 and beyond, long after the Hungarian market was already 
substantially saturated and after these latter countries had begun to adopt investment 
promotion policies similar to those in Hungary. Moreover, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia never established IFTZ’s,
21 and the Czech Republic and Slovakia only 
began creating industrial parks after 2000 (Sass, 2003: 17). Hungary was likewise the 
first country in Central and Eastern Europe to seriously consider privatizing its “core” 
strategic industries. According to Mihalyi, the other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe resisted privatizing sectors such as energy, banking, telecommunications and 
chemicals until 1994 or 1995 (2001: 72). These factors, as well as many of the legislative 
decisions noted above that gave foreign investors easy and broad access to Hungarian 
industry helped Hungary to move forward more rapidly and attract more investment 
capital than other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
                                                 
20 Sass (2004: 75). See also Antalóczy and Sass (2001) and Antalóczy (1999). 
21 Poland did establish “special economic zones”, but the regulations associated with these were too 
cumbersome to successfully attract significant amounts of FDI (Uminski, 2001: 91-2). Nevertheless, 
Poland requested a transition period for these special economic zones until 2017 but was turned down by 
the Commission (EP Fact Sheet, 2003). 
  9  Fiscal aids granted in the form of tax benefits amount, in Hungary, to a significant 
overall share of state aid. According to the report of the Hungarian State Aid Monitoring 
Office (2002)—and depending on whether or not state support for the railroads are 
excluded from these calculations—state aids in the form of tax benefits amount 
respectively to either 76.8% or 46.4% of all state aids in the year 2000. This level of state 
support was in fact quite common for several years. Between 1998 and the year 2000, tax 
benefits amounted to between 72.9% and 76.8% of state aid.
22 In previous years, the 
share of tax benefits in overall state aid was smaller (58.7% and 58.2% in 1996 and 1997 
respectively), but at that time the Hungarian government was granting significantly more 
direct support to the steel sector. In the form of tax concessions, in 1998 the Hungarian 
government granted 381.4 million Euros in tax benefits, 290.6 million Euros in 1999, and 
371.3 million Euros in 2000.
23
  Many of these arrangements met with problems in the area of competition policy 
and state aids during the negotiation of the EU Accession Treaty.
24 Thus, for example, 
the Hungarian tax law passed in 2001 (and that entered into force in January, 2003) in 
response to complaints from Brussels allows a far more restricted practice of favoring 
large investments. Firms investing 10 billion Hungarian Forint in developed regions and 
3 billion Hungarian Forint in less developed regions are now eligible for a tax deduction 
worth up to 35%-50% of the original investment depending on the region in which the 
investment takes place (not a 0% rate on all Hungarian operations as was the case under 
the 1996 law).
25 This deduction can be carried forward for up to 5 years until the entire 
35-50% of the original investment has been deducted. Since this revised strategy qualifies 
as “regional development”, it has been approved under the framework of EU restrictions 
on state aids.  
At the same time Hungary was required to discontinue many of the original 
agreements made with large foreign investors between 1996 and 2002. According to 
representatives from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance, the agreement between Hungary 
and the European Union essentially allows large investors who signed contracts prior to 
2002 to recoup up to the full amount of their original investments in tax write-offs (rather 
than allowing firms to retain 0% tax holidays until the full 10 year contract period runs 
out). As industrial free trade zones were deemed incompatible with EU regulations, 
Hungary and the other Central and East European countries likewise had to discontinue 
their use. However, given that the predominant share of trade of these industrial free trade 
zones took place with other EU Member States and firms, and given that goods can now 
move freely and without import duties within the European Single Market, the actual 
impact of this outcome is presumably negligible. 
                                                 
22 See the report of the State Aid Monitoring Office (2002: 17, Table 9). 
23 Ibid. (2000: 21 Table A2; 2002: 35 Table A2, 37 Table A4)    
24 In fact, some problems arose even prior to this date. For example, the EU used the Association 
Agreement Hungary had signed with EU as the basis for objecting that Hungary’s attempts to base tax 
reductions on export performance were a form of indirect export promotion. As a result, Hungary changed 
this legislation in 1996 to promote production and not explicitly exports (Éltetö, 1998: 9). 
25 Based on an interview with the Hungarian Ministry of Finance, the actual shares are 35% for investments 
in the Budapest area, 40% in the Pest country area, 45% for investments in Western Hungary, and 50% for 
investments in the remaining and typically less developed regions of Hungary (this last category is the 
largest). 
  10However, the January 2003 revisions to the corporate tax law raise concerns. 
Foreign direct investment—despite Hungary’s quite remarkable ability to attract foreign 
capital in the earlier transition years—has declined recently, leaving analysts trying to 
understand what has happened. Apart from the general decline in foreign direct 
investment in 2001 and 2002, some blame the decline in Hungary on the inadequacy of 
the current law. And the Hungarian corporate tax rate was amended in 2004, reducing the 
corporate tax rate from 18% to 16%.
26  As suggested by representatives from the Ministry 
of Finance, the Hungarian government would not have adopted the new January 2003 
revisions had it not been for the obligations of EU membership and the adoption of the 
Acquis. Whether or not these factors are directly responsible for the Hungarian rate of 
FDI is more complex. For one, FDI inflows increased again in 2004.
27 For another, the 
end of privatization in Hungary and well as world business cycle effects have all played a 
role in the overall decline in FDI inflows. 
The above methods are not the only way in which the Hungarian government has 
attempted to encourage foreign investors to locate in Hungary. Nor is this the only 
practice that has been threatened by the requirement of adopting EU law. A number of 
“concessionary” or monopoly agreements were likewise negotiated between the 
Hungarian government and foreign investors in order to attract sizable investments in 
Hungarian infrastructure. In the case of Matáv, the Hungarian telecommunications 
company, the government was able to attract and retain foreign investment by 
guaranteeing a national monopoly in the telecommunications sector for the first 8 years. 
Without this arrangement and the attraction of a national monopoly, Matáv might not 
have been able to put together the necessary capital needed to rebuild its 
telecommunications infrastructure.
28 Similar arrangements were made in the mobile 
telephone sector with first two and then later three different foreign investors. The 
monopoly or cartel agreements in these sectors were initiated in 1992, and the mobile 
phone sector agreement was re-negotiated in 1994 in order to admit one new market 
player.
29 Both of these concession arrangements had to be terminated as one of the 
conditions of EU membership.  
  Similar arrangements were also made in order to promote investment in the 
construction of Hungarian motorways and in the privatization of Hungarian power plants. 
Apart from the publicly owned MVM, as noted above, and the Hungarian nuclear power 
plant (PAKS), all remaining power stations in Hungary were privatized with the help of 
preferential agreements that included explicit long-term price and 8% profit guarantees. 
                                                 
26 KPMG Media Release: “Corporate Tax Rates Continue to Fall Worldwide”, March 23, 2004. 
27 Though the figures here include estimates of reinvested profits for 2004, there was a substantial increase 
in FDI inflows in 2004. The most recent FDI data (including reinvested profits) is available on the website 
of the Hungarian National Bank (www.mnb.hu). 
28 The offer of a national monopoly was clearly a tool used to attract foreign investment (see for example 
Szanyi, 1993). Matáv’s financial position in the early 90’s made it virtually impossible to undertake the 
investments required to successfully modernize the Hungarian telecommunications sector. In the late 80’s, 
Matáv published a 10-year plan that estimated the cost of the required investments at 380 billion HUF. At 
the same time, the government’s annual expenditure on all infrastructure needs at that time amounted to 30 
billion HUF (Tóth, 1993: 39-41). 
29 Deutsche Telekom has been the principal investor in Matáv, while Pannon and Westel have been the 
principal investors in the mobile phone sector. Vodafone was the third Western company admitted to the 
Hungarian mobile phone market in 1994. 
  11EU membership has explicitly affected only some of these agreements. In the energy 
sector, for example, the complete liberalization of access to the energy grid will be 
introduced as of 2004 (for all non-household energy consumption) and 2007 (for all 
consumption). It is not immediately clear how this will affect the preferential purchase 
agreements that MVM has signed with various private energy producers, but it is likely 
that this will have a negative impact on the MVM’s bottom line.
30 Most of the Hungarian 
motorway agreements ran their course prior to the final date of enlargement. Thus, as 
long as Hungary observes EU public procurement regulations, it is not likely that future 
agreements will be greatly affected by the fact of EU membership. 
Hungarian strategies have gradually begun to shift away from simple capital 
attraction schemes to strategies intended to promote the diffusion of knowledge and 
technology.  Thus while some of the more attractive fiscal tax-based mechanisms noted 
above have been curtailed or reduced in scope, a new generation of programs is gradually 
being put in place. These programs attempt to respond in important ways to some of the 
deficiencies of previous capital-seeking strategies and attempt to expand R&D and build 
upon potential synergies across and between firms and various types of research 
institutions. The Hungarian government’s “Smart Hungary” program for example, 
applied to investments as of Dec. 31
st, 2002 and offered additional investment promotion 
incentives to support the development of technology. Firms investing in R&D, for 
example, were able to deduct up to 200% of those costs from their corporate tax base.
31
Buzás and Szanyi (2004) point to the potential importance of the more 
“knowledge-based” focus of a number of government programs geared toward promoting 
both the development of technology and its diffusion. The authors seem most enthusiastic 
about the development of “Cooperation Research Centers” (CRC’s) in 2001 that have 
been funded with government grants of between 0.2 and 1 million US Dollars and have 
been established at different universities in Hungary. One of the goals of these research 
centers was to include business partners in the activities of the Centers. CRC’s have been 
established in Budapest (2), Pécs (in cooperation with partners in Budapest and Szeged), 
Veszprém and Szeged. Further projects have been established since this initial set of five 
projects. Furthermore, the cooperative research these centers engage in is also eligible for 
tax deductions (Buzás and Szanyi, 2004: 22-3).  
  As Buzás and Szanyi note, other projects the government has initiated appear to 
be less successful. For example the Hungarian government offered grants to 
entrepreneurs with academic scientific backgrounds to turn their knowledge into business 
                                                 
30 There have already been significant problems in this regard, since the preferential agreements that 
Hungary signed have bound the MVM to pay more to producers for electricity than it is always able to sell 
it for to consumers. Moreover, these preferential purchasing agreements are valid for some 20-25 years 
from the date of signing (approximately 1997). Thus MVM (and the Hungarian government) will most 
likely be compensating significant losses in the energy sector for many years to come (2017-2023) (see 
Bakos, 2001). What makes matters worse, complete liberalization of the Energy sector may even lower 
energy supply prices, thus having a potentially more serious impact on the related costs to the Hungarian 
government (and possibly the Hungarian consumer). Bakos estimates these potential losses at 300 billion 
Hungarian Forint (2001: 1129). However, this estimate cannot adequately account for the costs of complete 
liberalization. 
31 See both the program announcement from the Ministry of Economy and Transport (2002), and Ernst & 
Young (2003: 33-4). 
  12enterprises. But this particular project has generated a rather small number of 
applications. Further efforts have been made to promote the development of Technology 
Learning Offices (TLO’s) in the university setting. However, according to the authors, 
the lack of available capital has left TLO’s at the mercy of investors and inventors. Few 
patents have remained in the hands of the TLO’s, making them weak potential 
disseminators of technology (Buzás and Szanyi, 2004: 25-6). 
  Industrial parks constitute a final category discussed by Buzás and Szanyi. While 
the authors seem less enthusiastic about these parks, their numbers have increased 
substantially in Hungary since they were first promoted by the government in 1996. As 
noted by the Association of Hungarian Industrial Parks (AHIP/IPE), there were 165 
industrial parks distributed throughout Hungary by May 2004.
32 Thus industrial parks 
have seen quite substantial growth in Hungary. However, Buzás and Szanyi remain 
sanguine about their potential impact on the diffusion of technology. As the authors note, 
the Infopark in Budapest—one of the more successful industrial parks—brings together 
the Ministry of the Economy, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Budapest University of 
Technology and the Eötvös Loránd University of Sciences (ELTE), and has attracted the 
participation of large firms (Matáv, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Nortel and Panasonic). 
However, this industrial park has not been successful at attracting further investors or in 
achieving more centralized forms of information sharing. Insufficient centralization of 
technology services has led each firm to create its own services. Thus little sharing of 
technology occurs (2004: 28). 
 
What Has Been Achieved? 
To some degree, a consensus is emerging about the need to go beyond simple 
privatization and industrial restructuring in Hungary and other countries. While this 
literature typically does not criticize the phenomenon of privatization through foreign 
direct investment (FDI), it does suggest that the accumulation of foreign capital alone is 
not sufficient to achieve long-term economic development. As Szanyi for example points 
out, previously the principal indicator of economic competitiveness was thought to be the 
introduction of technologically sophisticated production techniques. Thus increasing FDI 
specialization in technology intensive economic branches was seen as an indicator of 
overall economic competitiveness in the CEEC’s. As Szanyi notes, current research 
suggests the actual “technology and knowledge content” of the work performed in Central 
and East European countries more strongly emphasizes the assembly of products and less 
frequently their design and development. Thus increasingly theoretical and empirical 
work has begun to measure the share of the “local contribution” (2003?: 5).  
Four questions in particular seem most relevant to determining the degree to 
which multinational affiliates or domestic firms are developing sustainable long-term 
patterns of economic growth. First, to what degree do the activities of Hungarian 
affiliates transcend simple assembly work and involve the accumulation of organizational 
and research-related tasks in the hands of affiliates or supplier firms (notion of 
“embeddedness”). Second, to what degree does the presence of foreign multinationals 
                                                 
32 See the website of the Association of Hungarian Industrial Parks (http://www.datanet.hu/ipe/). 
  13lead to technology spillover to other local firms. Third, to what degree has the R&D 
activity of multinationals been transferred to local firms. And a fourth and related 
question, to what degree are domestic firms incorporated into the production (supplier) 
networks of larger foreign multinationals operating on domestic soil.
33 This last point is 
strongly linked to the first and third, since many assume the integration of domestic 
suppliers into the production networks of locally established foreign multinationals may 
also facilitate the process of technological spillover. 
The response to these points is mixed. The relative degree of “embeddedness” of 
Hungarian affiliates is thought to be superficial (Szalavetz, 2003). As Szalavetz points 
out, the degree of integration of Hungarian affiliates into the global production networks 
of the foreign multinational partners is quite ‘thin’, i.e. the range of potential 
responsibilities of Hungarian affiliates is limited by the demands of foreign multinational 
headquarters. Thus Szalavetz finds that the Hungarian affiliates of foreign multinational 
networks are caught up in hierarchically fixed vertical production networks that leave 
them vulnerable to the whims of foreign capital and fluctuations in the international 
market. Pavlínek comes to a similar conclusion, noting that the vertical integration of 
local plants into international production networks makes them more vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the international economy and to the strategic decisions of multinational 
firms (2004: 52). 
The rate of technological diffusion is likewise typically given somewhat low 
marks. While firms that are the direct recipients of FDI have often seen significant 
changes in their technological capacity (Sass, 2004: 81), the rate at which technology has 
diffused across such boundaries is somewhat more controversial. Some analyses even 
suggest that the principal changes in productivity in the late 90’s were more the result of 
labor shedding than the introduction of new technology (Novák, 1999). The evidence on 
actual technological spillovers is thin. Novák (2003), for example, finds that there has 
been only a marginal impact on domestic firms and that competition effects and the 
presence of linkages with foreign multinationals had stronger effects on technological 
change. Pavlínek likewise surveys a number of authors who find little or no evidence for 
technological spillover (2004). Schoors and Van der Tol (2002) are among the few 
authors to find significant positive evidence for spillover. The principal barriers to 
technological spillover appear to be weak linkages with domestic firms and/or attempts 
on the part of foreign affiliates to control the likelihood of spillover.
34
With respect to the remaining points, there are important anecdotal examples of 
the extensive transfer of capital, technology and research and innovation potential. 
General Electric (GE), for example, transferred both production and R&D activities to 
Hungarian soil. GE’s investments in the Hungarian firm Tungsram have ultimately 
resulted in the transfer of 90% of GE’s European production activity and 50% of GE’s 
global R&D activities to Hungary (Berend, 2000: 58). A number of other firms have 
                                                 
33 A good overview of the literature on these last two points is provided by Sass (2004). 
34 On this last point, Lorentzen and Mollgard (2002) find that in fact many investors in Central and Eastern 
Europe in fact imposed “vertical restraint agreements” that prohibited affiliates from using transferred 
technology for production activities outside the framework of the existing joint-venture agreement. 
However, such agreements are illegal under EU law, and thus were presumably rescinded with the advent 
of EU membership. 
  14likewise made significant investments in R&D centers. Pavlínek notes that the motor 
building part of Germany’s Audi completed a new R&D center in Györ, Hungary in 
2001, while the German truck and bus brake manufacturer Knorr-Bremse built an R&D 
center in Budapest in 1999. Other examples can be found for neighboring countries 
(Pavlínek, 2004: 62). The Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency (ITDH) 
points to the R&D activities of some 30 large corporations as an indication of important 
R&D activity locating in Hungary (Kilian, 2003: 14). And Sass notes that important firms 
such as Nokia, Ericsson, Siemens and Compaq have all transferred parts of their R&D 
activities to Hungary (2004: 81).  
  In general however, satisfaction with the degree of transfer of R&D activity is 
quite low. Pavlínek, for example, points out that there is an international hierarchy of 
R&D activities. Large multinational firms are likely to keep their primary R&D activities 
close to their national headquarters and may even transfer R&D activities from affiliates 
to the multinational headquarters. When R&D activities are transferred to local affiliates, 
these are likely to be related to either local product development or to small-scale applied 
research (2004: 59). All in all, Pavlínek is quite skeptical about the likely transfer of 
extensive R&D activities to Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, R&D activity has 
declined dramatically from its previous levels just prior to the transition. Havas, for 
example, notes that R&D expenditures in Hungary amounted to some 2.3% of GDP in 
1988.  However, by 1999, this sum had dropped dramatically to approximately 0.68% of 
GDP. On the other hand, for what is presumably the same period, the Old EU Member 
states R&D expenditures average around 1.8-2% of GDP (2001: 11-12). While few 
expect Hungary’s R&D expenditure to reach pre-1989 levels anytime soon,
35 the gap 
between the Old EU Member states and Central and East European countries is a cause 
for concern. 
There are examples of increasing links between suppliers and MNC affiliates in 
Hungary. Sass points out that there are important differences in the different types of FDI 
and their relative impact on supplier networks. Privatization FDI, for example, appears to 
have led frequently to the maintenance of local supplier networks, while Greenfield FDI 
(investment in completely new production facilities) appears to be more frequently 
associated with very weak links between local suppliers and foreign affiliates (Sass, 
2004: 79). An interesting comparison in this regard is that between FDI in the car 
industry in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In Hungary, most investment in the car 
industry takes the form of Greenfield investments (though prior to WWI there had been a 
car industry in Hungary, during the socialist era there was no car production in Hungary). 
Thus, FDI in the car industry in Hungary had no pre-existing network of suppliers to 
integrate into the regional investment and production network, and there was no pre-
existing Hungarian auto-manufacturing firm that could have been privatized (Sass, 2004: 
80). On the other hand, according to Pavlínek, in the Czech Republic the privatization of 
Skoda led to the restructuring of Skoda’s pre-existing supplier network and thus to a far 
greater level of local integration. However, at the same time, Pavlínek points out 
problems with the degree of “embeddedness” of local suppliers, noting that often these 
                                                 
35 The EU’s Lisbon Agenda encourages countries to bring their national-level R&D expenditures up to 3% 
of GDP by 2010. 
  15local suppliers also perform only minor assembly operations for products that are largely 
produced elsewhere (2004: 54-5). 
Even with all the different government programs introduced to promote greater 
levels of R&D and technological diffusion, there may still be significant barriers 
restricting the likely impact of such efforts. Taking Szalavetz’s approach it is not clear 
that local affiliates, for example, have sufficient latitude to deepen their sphere of 
responsibility toward their multinational headquarters. Ownership barriers make it 
difficult for affiliates of large multinational firms to autonomously define their sphere of 
operation. In this sense, hierarchical relationships with MNC’s may represent inflexible 
vertical barriers that impede the development of horizontal activities.
36 At the same time, 
it may be possible for domestic firms to engage in such practices more easily than for 
fully owned foreign affiliates. Videoton is a good example of a Hungarian firm that has 
diversified its production strategies in multiple directions and is not dependent upon any 
one multinational production goal. This presumably depends on the fact that Videoton is 
a publicly traded firm, while other greenfield type foreign affiliates are 100% (or very 
close to 100% foreign owned).
37
In this regard, both the degree of incorporation into core-periphery networks and 
the degree of foreign ownership may ultimately prove to be a liability rather than an 
asset. The greater the share of fully owned foreign firms and the greater the share of 
foreign ownership in individual firms, the more difficult it may be to promote deeper 
embeddedness in multinational production strategies. 100% foreign owned affiliates 
again may have little authority to engage in the diversification of tasks, whereas publicly 
traded Hungarian firms are potentially better suited to do so. Thus the degree of foreign 
ownership may paradoxically hinder the creation of sustainable economic development 
goals. 
Thus the basic concern of most theorists is what factors best explain the ability of 
Central and East European countries to go beyond economic growth to real economic 
development. The distinction is not facile. The implication is that mere capital 
deepening—improvements in the capital/labor ratio—are not sufficient to create the 
foundations for long-term economic development. While this may improve productivity 
and technological capability, this should not be equated with the potential to produce new 
technologies, innovation and thus long-term economic development. According to this 
logic, the ability to achieve domestically driven economic growth and capital deepening 
depends on the ability to spearhead technological innovation on its own account, and not 
as a result of exogenous factors. Such an account does not denigrate the value of 
imported technology and capital deepening—by all accounts, FDI brings with it 
productivity improvements and thus the potential for economic growth. But complete 
reliance on exogenous forms of technology and innovation potential risks creating 
                                                 
36 Sass, citing Vince, essentially makes this claim (2004: 80). 
37 Pavlínek appears to note a similar example in the Czech firm PAL Praha which manufactures small 
electric engines for a larger foreign firm (Magna). As a joint venture project, PAL retains considerable 
managerial autonomy from Magna and has invested in its own R&D center for which PAL remains fully 
responsible. Nor does PAL transfer its R&D results to Magna (2004: 62). Such a constellation would 
presumably not be possible for most MNC affiliates without the degree of managerial autonomy provided 
by the joint venture relationship between PAL and Magna. 
  16dependency and may fail to create the necessary conditions for long-term sustainable 
economic development in Central and Eastern Europe. 
  Considerations of this type also raise concerns regarding the relative vulnerability 
of Central and East European countries to capital mobility. If these countries are in fact 
dependent upon external sources for the degree of capital deepening and ultimately 
innovation potential, then the footloose nature of investment capital poses real problems 
for the future competitiveness and sustainability of Central and East European economic 
development. Such concerns are reinforced by current discussion of the declining rate of 
foreign direct investment in Hungary, and in particular whether FDI is likely to move to 
other countries further East or even to Asia (Kalotay, 2003). Even with the inclusion of 
reinvested profits in the calculation of FDI flows (something that previous estimates of 
Hungarian FDI flows tended to omit), FDI inflows in 2003 were almost half those of 
inflows in 2001 (Sass, 2004: 68). However, as noted above, FDI inflows rose 
substantially in 2004. 
At the same time, there are significant examples of foreign multinationals leaving 
the territory to produce further East. IBM (previously the largest exporter and importer in 
Hungary) and Marc Shoe (Szanyi, 2003?: 14), Mannesmann, one of their suppliers 
(Shinwa), Solectron and Flextronics moved part or all of their production either to China 
or to Romania (in the case of Solectron) (Pavlínek, 2004: 55-6). Nor is Hungary an 
exception. Similar stories are recounted about production in the Czech Republic. 
Pavlínek notes the examples of the German firm Varta Aku, the Belgian firm Massive 
Production, and the Japanese-German firm Takta Petri, four firms that moved from the 
Czech Republic to either China or to unspecified locations, typically as a result of wage 
considerations (ibid., 56). As Pavlínek notes, there are even examples of producers trying 
to minimize their sunk costs in order to retain greater geographic flexibility. Pavlínek 
points to the example of a supplier firm that owns the machinery and equipment in a plant 
in the Czech Republic, but not the actual building (2004: 58). Moreover, the smaller 
individual New Member states are, the more vulnerable they are to the interests of 
individual large multinational investors and firms. According to Pavlínek, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, for example, are increasingly dependent upon the strategic 
interests of Volkswagen, which was responsible for 14% of Czech and 16% of Slovak 
exports in 1999 (2004: 63, 65). IBM—as noted above—is another case in point, though 
more recently IBM announced a significant expansion of its remaining activities in 
Hungary.
38
  The Hungarian National Development Plan 2004-2006, published as part of its 
application for EU structural and cohesion funds for the same calendar period (2004-
2006) outlines Hungarian concerns about declining levels of foreign direct investment 
and focuses attention on the general shift in investment promotion strategies noted above:  
Hungary’s investment attracting capabilities have recently declined in 
parallel with an increase in labour costs and more intensive competition 
                                                 
38 In March 2005, IBM announced that it would undertake investments of $35.5 million in Hungary and 
between 2003 and 2008 would undertake further considerable investments eventually employing some 
17,000 workers (www.nol.hu: “IBM: 6.5 milliárdos beruházás, 700 munkahely” IBM: 6.5 billion Forint 
Investment, 700 jobs, March 3, 2005). 
  17from low cost economies. This calls for a shift in investment promotion 
policy: the objective now is to support the attraction and retention of 
activities representing a high added value and promote their embedding 
into the Hungarian economy. (Prime Minister’s Office, 2003: 204) 
On the other hand, data published by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe illustrates that real gross fixed capital formation in Hungary has continuously 
risen between 1995 and 2002 (the latest year for which there were available data).
39 Thus 
although FDI inflows in the Hungarian economy may have reached a degree of 
saturation, overall investment in the Hungarian economy appears to be consistently on 
the rise. In this regard, Hungary is even a bit of an outlier, since the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania all experienced significant short-term dips in 1999 (and 
for Latvia in both 1999 and 2000).
40
 
The EU Policy Framework and the New Member States 
The central question that follows from the discussion in the previous section is 
whether the EU policy framework is compatible with the competitiveness and economic 
development concerns of the Central and East European states. The potential for policy 
divergence is perhaps best grasped from a quick reading of the European Commission’s 
Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Published in February 2004, three 
months prior to the final date of the Accession, the report outlines the significant 
differences in the level of economic development between the Western and Eastern parts 
of the New Europe: 
Average GDP per head in these 10 countries is under half the average in 
the present EU and only 56% of those of working age are in jobs as 
against 64% in the EU15… 
Some 92% of the people in the new Member States live in regions with 
GDP per head below 75% of the EU25 average and over two-thirds in 
regions where it is under half the average… 
If Bulgaria and Romania, where GDP per head is under 30% of the EU25 
average, were to join the Union, the population living in regions with GDP 
per head below 75% of the EU average would more than double from the 
present number (from around 73 million to over 153 million). The gap 
between their average GDP per head and the EU average would also 
double (from around 30% below average to over 60% below)… 
[As a result, EU] socio-economic disparities will double and the average 
GDP of the Union will decrease by 12.5%... 
The effect of enlargement is to add just under 5% to EU GDP (measured 
in Euros) but almost 20% to the Union’s population.
41  
                                                 
39 See the Economic Survey of Europe, (2004, No. 1: 191, Appendix Table B.3). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Passages selected from the Executive Summary of the Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion 
(European Commission, 2004a). 
  18Across the New Europe, the quite dramatic widening of differences in the level of 
economic development may well drive a parallel widening of policy interests across the 
various New and Old Member States. 
Several elements of the EU policy framework are specifically directed at the 
problem of competitiveness and economic development and are of potential interest to 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the context of the Eastern Enlargement, at 
least three areas are highly salient. Debates over the future distribution of Structural and 
Cohesion Funds, over the potential harmonization of corporate taxation rates, and over 
the role of state aids and competition policy more generally are likely to dominate 
political and intellectual debate in the coming years. These three areas in particular most 
strongly exhibit the potential for the divergence of interests with respect to economic 
competitiveness and development interests. The remainder of this section will address 
each of these policy areas in turn.  
    Current discussions of potential reforms of the EU’s Structural and Cohesion 
Funds already provide an indication of the potential for the divergence of interests in the 
New Europe. The so-called Sapir Report (European Commission, 2003)—intended to 
provide proposals on future reforms of the Structural and Cohesion Funds—emerged 
with the broad recommendation that these funds be re-nationalized. This initiative has 
received some support from Old Member States of the European Union.
42 It should come 
as no surprise that re-nationalization is likely to be supported by those states that are “net 
contributors” to the EU budget (in particular Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria 
and the UK). On the other hand, the New Member states have strong incentives to insist 
on maintaining or even increasing the amplitude of the EU’s Structural and Cohesion 
Funds. In fact, some effort has already been put into studying both the interests of Old 
and New Member states in this policy and the potential leeway for raising the amount of 
money available for these funds.
43
  The willingness of the EU to dedicate significant funds to policies of Economic 
and Social Cohesion is questionable. The amounts set aside in the Commission’s 
proposal for the financial perspective 2007-2013
44 provide only minor increases over 
previous amounts (see Table I below). Between 2006 and 2007, spending increases by 
10% for the year in which Bulgaria and Romania are scheduled to join, but by much 
smaller amounts in following years. Seen in per-capita terms, the amounts set aside for 
Structural and Cohesion fund spending remain almost constant, 0.26 Euros per person in 
2006 and 0.27 Euros per person in 2007. From 2007 to 2013 per capita expenditures 
slowly rise to 0.32 Euros per person, but inflation is likely to wipe out these gains. Seen 
in the context of the above noted doubling in the EU population living below 75% of the 
EU average, these sums are somewhat startling. Despite no mention of re-nationalization, 
there does appear to be a trend in this direction. Central and East European countries will 
be required to pick up a far greater share of the tab for economic restructuring than the 
former cohesion countries. 
                                                 
42 See for example Tarschys (2003). 
43 See for example the report published by the Hungarian Institute for World Economics (Szemlér, 2004). 
44 See “Building our Common Future: Financial and Political Outlook for the Enlarged Union 2007-2013”, 
(COM(2004) 101 final). 
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[Table I about here: Proposed EU Expenditures on Structural and Cohesion Funds, 2006-
2013] 
 
Debates over rates of corporate taxation in Europe exhibit similarly strong 
insistence on national interests. Wrangling over the future of EU tax harmonization was 
initiated by Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in March of 2004, only two months 
prior to the official date of entry into the EU. Though many states profess a strong 
interest in corporate taxation policy, Germany (with the support of France and other 
countries) led the charge against the comparatively low corporate tax rates offered in the 
Central and East European countries. Schröder went so far as to complain of “fiscal 
dumping”, noting that these countries have average corporate tax rates below 20%, while 
the West European average hovers around 31-32%. Several states including Germany and 
Sweden have complained that low corporate tax rates in Central and Eastern Europe are 
being financed by EU funding.
45 Together, France and Germany—later joined by Poland 
despite previous resistance to this effort—launched an attempt to introduce a minimum 
rate of corporate taxation in Europe.
46 Though this effort has so far been resisted by the 
Commission, Britain, Ireland and several of the Central and East European states,
47 on 
Sept. 6
th, 2004, France’s Finance Minister Nicholas Sarkozy explicitly attempted to link 
Structural and Cohesion Fund support to compliance with a future EU regulated 
minimum level of corporate taxation.
48 Poland however was strongly opposed to this 
effort.
49
Discussion of the potential harmonization of corporate tax rates predates the 
accession. EU membership negotiations first began uncovering problems in this area. 
Estonia’s “liberal” corporate tax regime was criticized by Romano Prodi as a potential 
“problem” for the EU as early as March, 2002. In particular, France, Italy and Spain were 
concerned that Estonia’s corporate tax regime constituted an “’unfair’ competitive 
advantage”.
50 As the above noted example of Hungary suggests, similar problems arose 
with other countries. At least prior to the enlargement, it was difficult to make any 
headway on harmonization. In response to the Enlargement, several countries in Western 
Europe have already begun to lower their average rates of corporate taxation. In 
particular, effective on January 1
st, 2005, Austria lowered its corporate tax rate from 34% 
to 24%.
51 Germany likewise lowered its federal corporate tax rate from 40% for 
“retained” earnings, and 30% for “distributed” earnings to a flat rate of 25% in January, 
                                                 
45 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, “New EU States Use Low Tax Rates as Investment Bait” 
(4/25/2004). 
46 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, “Warsaw, Berlin and Paris Call for Harmonisation of EU 
Taxes” (7/22/2004). 
47 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, “EU Embroiled in Taxing Debate Over ‘Fiscal Dumping’” 
(9/11/2004). 
48 See e.g. Reuters.com: “Paris Idea to Link EU Funds, Tax Gets Cold Reception” (9/06/2004). 
49 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, “Poland Joins Outcry Against French Proposal on EU 
Funds” (9/9/2004). 
50 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, “Commission Questions Estonia’s Liberal Corporate Tax 
Regime” (3/8/2002). 
51 See the website of the Federal Chancellary of Austria (http://www.austria.gv.at/). 
  202001.
52 Moreover, Germany is currently considering a further reduction to 19%. 
However, given high local corporate tax rates in Germany, the effective rate of corporate 
taxation will remain much higher 38.7% at the current rate and 32.7% at the suggested 
rate.
53
While there has in fact been a long-standing debate about corporate tax 
harmonization in the European Union (see e.g. Radaelli, 2001), the enlargement may 
ultimately be more successful in bringing this issue to the table. However, British and 
Irish resistance is significant. The UK in particular is responsible for retaining the right to 
a National Veto on taxation issues in the new Constitutional Treaty approved by the 
European Council in June 2004.
54 Moreover, the UK—as has been made clear on 
separate occasions by Gordon Brown, British Chancellor of the Exchequer—appears 
steadfastly opposed to any move in the direction of tax harmonization.
55 Ireland—
currently the EU Member state with the lowest rate of corporate taxation—likewise has 
every reason to continue to oppose the harmonization of corporate tax rates. Given that 
most of the Central and East European countries are opposed to such a move, and given 
that such decisions—now or in the future under the new European Constitution—will 
require unanimity in the Council of Ministers, it is unlikely corporate tax rates will be 
harmonized any time soon. This does not remove the possibility, however, that some of 
the Old Member states who are most concerned about the consequences of corporate tax 
competition in the New Europe might attempt to link this issue to others (such as the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds) and pressure the New Member states into compliance.  
Whether harmonization is justified on the basis of variation in rates of corporate 
taxation across countries is more problematic. Determining actual levels of corporate 
taxation across countries is no simple matter. While statutory rates are typically easily 
accessible, these rates differ from those firms actually pay for several reasons. Countries 
have very different rules and taxation rates based on anything from how firms are 
allowed to calculate and deduct the depreciation of physical capital, to the rate at which 
retained and distributed corporate earnings are taxed, to the role of various deductions 
available for region-specific investments. The consequence is that so-called “effective” 
rates of corporate taxation differ, sometimes substantially, from “statutory” rates of 
corporate taxation.
56  
These difficulties aside, based on statutory rates of corporate taxation, there is 
little evidence that the EU genuinely needs to engage in the harmonization of corporate 
tax rates. Table II below provides some preliminary data on rates of corporate taxation 
across countries and likewise provides calculations of the regional averages of corporate 
taxation across the New and Old Europe and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
There are significant differences between the unweighted average rates of corporate 
                                                 
52 See the information website of the German government: http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/-
business/taxes/german_tax_rates.html. 
53 See the Economist: “Taxing Times”, March 21, 2005. 
54 The Constitutional Treaty must further be ratified by each of the Member States, a process that could 
take up to two years from the original date of passage. 
55 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, “Chancellor Schroeder Slams ‘Fiscal Dumping’ by New 
EU States” (4/29/2004), and “EU Embroiled in Taxing Debate Over ‘Fiscal Dumping’” (9/11/2004). 
56 Attempts have been made to measure these different rates of corporate taxation. See for example the 
work of Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). 
  21taxation for the Old Member states and the CEEC’s (29.4% and either 21.5% or 18.9% 
respectively based on current and projected rates of corporate taxation). The unweighted 
average across the New Europe is not as low, but there is nonetheless an important drop 
from the previous average rate of corporate taxation (29.4% and either 25.9% or 24.7% 
respectively based on current and projected rates of corporate taxation).  
 
[Table II about here: Average Corporate Tax Rates in Europe] 
 
A strong case can be made for using weighted averages of corporate taxation 
based on relative population sizes rather than unweighted averages. The principal reason 
is that even though some countries may have quite low rates of corporate taxation, the 
relative size of the employable population provides a significant upper limit on the 
potential for European capital to take advantage of this variation in tax rates. The 
differences in the weighted averages across the Old Europe and the CEEC’s remain large 
(30.1% and 21.4% respectively). But the differences across the Old and the New Europe 
are far less substantial (30.1% and 28.3% or 28.1% respectively based on current and 
projected rates of corporate taxation). In this second case, the change in the average rate 
of corporate taxation across the Old and New Europe is at most 2%. Moreover, the 
Central and East European countries have raised rather than lowered their rates in more 
recent years due to the requirement of compatibility with EU law. Given these 
calculations it is difficult to understand the degree of conviction with which some of the 
Old Member states are pursuing this issue.  
Taking a glance at data on the FDI behavior of the Old Members states, Japan and 
the US (See Table III), these countries have not been moving their investments at any 
great pace toward Central and Eastern Europe. While a few countries do exhibit a 
considerable shift in their regional FDI strategies, above all Austria and to a far more 
moderate degree Germany, for the most part the Western states only exhibit a relatively 
mild shift in their investment behavior toward Central and Eastern Europe. The majority 
of Old EU member states have investment rates in Central and Eastern Europe that 
remain well below 5% of their investment rates in the former “European core” (the 
“European core” is defined as the set of more advanced Old EU Member states, 
excluding the cohesion countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain).  
 
[Table III about here: Share of CEEC FDI Relative to FDI in the European Core] 
 
France’s Central and East European FDI, for example, only represents 4.1% of its 
European core investments in 1999. On the other hand, Germany’s Central and East 
European investment share represents a good 10.3% of its European core investments in 
1999. Oddly enough, Austria, though so far not a party to the complaints of France, 
Germany and Sweden, has seen excessive rates of investment in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Though these investments seem to have hit their highpoint in 1997 (at 72.6% of 
their investments in the European core), in 1999, they still represented 62.1% of 
investments in the European core. Greece as well remains an outlier with its Central and 
  22East European investments almost equaling its investments in the European core in 1998, 
but dropping off quite precipitously by the year 2000. In recent years, a reversal of the 
previous trend may be emerging. As noted above, Hungary and other CEEC’s have 
begun to experience declining rates of FDI, although Hungarian FDI rose again 
substantially in 2004. Finally, even with investment promotion incentives and low rates 
of corporate taxation, the total stock of FDI outflow from CEE have risen steadily over 
the years.
57
On the other hand, looking at data on the shift in Old Member state, Japanese and 
the US FDI behavior in the former cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain) (See Table IV), it becomes clear that much of the investment in Central and 
Eastern Europe may well occur at the expense of the former cohesion countries. The 
relative share of investment in Central and Eastern Europe has risen rapidly for Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the UK, Norway, 
Switzerland and the US. Though this shift in investment patterns is not typically 
accompanied by a decline in the absolute FDI figures in the former cohesion countries, in 
the absence of the fall of the East Bloc a share of the investment in Central and Eastern 
Europe might have gone to the former cohesion countries. This fact may well explain 
both Spain’s participation in this agenda, as well as the insistence of the former cohesion 
countries on their continued receipt of EU structural and cohesion funding. 
 
[Table IV about here: Share of CEEC FDI Relative to FDI in the Old Cohesion 
Countries] 
 
The European Commission has thus far resisted attempts to move toward the 
harmonization of corporate tax rates and has rejected the Sarkozy proposals. For one, 
Günter Verheugen, the new competition minister in 2004 (and previously Enlargement 
Commissioner) noted that rules for the distribution of structural and cohesion funds are 
already clear, suggesting it would be impossible to go back and rewrite them in order to 
bar low tax states from receiving them in the manner suggested by Sarkozy.
58 During the 
hearings for new Commissioners before the European Parliament during the fall of 2004, 
Verheugen in fact argued that tax competition “could be useful” and that the presence of 
lower tax rates in some states did “not necessarily lead to delocalization”.
59  
The third policy area likely to dominate future discussion in the New Europe is 
competition policy and the role of state aids. This policy area is in fact linked to the issue 
of rates of corporate taxation. During the accession negotiations, several of the New 
Member states were required to substantially modify generous tax holidays and other 
investment promotion schemes.
60 Ultimately, these methods of promoting FDI were seen 
                                                 
57 According to data from the website of the Hungarian National Bank, for example, total stocks of outward 
FDI have risen from 216.9 million Euros in 1995 to 2,566 million Euros in 2003. 
58 See www.euractiv.com (10/4/2004), “Verheugen calls Sarkozy’s Corporate Tax Ideas ‘Unrealistic’”. 
59 Ibid. See also Verheugen’s statements before the EP Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (EP 
New Report, 9/30/2004). 
60 In fact, the EU even used the early “European” or “Association Agreements” as a means to try and 
reduce the level of state subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
  23as state aids by the European Union and Hungary and other countries were required to 
dismantle or modify them. In fact, one of the conditions of EU membership set down at 
the 1993 Copenhagen Summit required that the economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
be capable of withstanding competition in the European Single Market. At least one of 
the key meanings of this phrase was that Central and East European firms should be able 
to survive economic competition without state support.  
Current EU approaches to economic competitiveness have been influenced both 
by the anti-statist and state interventionist traditions noted at the outset of this paper. On 
the anti-statist side, EU policy has gradually begun to favor greater and greater 
competition in economic domains previously considered the preeminent domain of the 
state (e.g. telecommunications, railways, energy). Free-market entry and open and 
competitive public procurement policies have clearly begun to pervade current practice in 
the provision of services.
61 And while privatization is not specifically a requirement of 
EU law, the EU does protect and promote both free competition with public sector 
utilities (such as state-owned telecommunications and postal services), and EU 
competition policy requires that public firms not make use of state resources in order to 
compete with private sector firms (Martin, 1999: 5). Likewise, the neo-liberal logic 
appears to pervade the shift away from providing government support to individual 
economic sectors, in particular, coal, steel, textiles and the clothing sector. The European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), for example was formally abandoned in 2002. 
On the statist interventionist side, EU policy has begun a gradual shift toward 
more neutral forms of state intervention. EU competition and industrial policy has begun 
to reflect this shift in emphasis. EU industrial policy in particular emphasizes 
“horizontal” state aid measures and eschews sectoral or what I refer to as vertical state 
aids. Horizontal state aids are aids focused on broadly applicable principles of economic 
development (human capital development, infrastructure, R&D) and potentially useful to 
a broad range of economic sectors. The only form of quasi-direct aid to individual firms 
that remains in this context is support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME’s) 
and to some extent regional aid. Sectoral or vertical state aids are aids that ultimately 
help to prop up declining economic sectors and/or firms (e.g. the steel, clothing and 
textile sectors in Western Europe).
62
The EU however has not dispensed with more vertical forms of government 
intervention. The EU continues to permit extensive government intervention in at least 
two sectors: agriculture and railways. Although the shift to horizontal measures has 
typically not affected agricultural policy in the EU, there is at least a general though 
excessively gradual trend towards the elimination of direct agricultural supports. In 
particular the June 2003 reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy imposes a 
gradual shift from the current system of direct payments to support for rural development. 
The railway sector remains the second sector in which the EU continues to allow 
                                                 
61 Since the late 80’s, the EU has pursued directives on open public procurement and the requirement of 
open EU-wide bidding on the provision of public services. 
62 For a excellent overview of these different state aid measures, see Martin (1999). The European 
Commission first announced the shift toward horizontal measures in 1994 with the publication of its report 
on “An Industrial Competitiveness Policy for the European Union”, COM(94) 319 final. This initiative has 
gained considerable momentum with the Lisbon Agenda announced at the 2000 Lisbon Summit. 
  24extensive public intervention. Moreover, while aid to the railway sector is typically 
detailed in the European Commission’s State Aid Scoreboards, this type of aid is still 
considered as a separate category not subject to general EU restrictions of the use of state 
aid. 
For another, the EU’s Regional Development policies remain a significant portion 
of the overall EU budget. Whether this policy area should be considered vertical or 
horizontal in character is more problematic. Within the framework of the EU’s 
regulations on state aid, states are permitted to engage in national projects of regional 
development. The Commission’s State Aid Scoreboard classifies regional aid as 
“horizontal”, suggesting such aid is in line with the shift to more broadly-based 
objectives. However much of regional state aid ends up in the hands of individual firms 
and investors. Moreover, whereas at the national level aid can be distributed using broad 
neutral criteria that do not favor individual firms, given the scale of regional and local 
development strategies, projects often target individual firms.
63 In 2002, some 31.5% of 
EU horizontal aid was defined as “regional” state aid (European Commission, 2004b: 
20). Moreover, across the EU as a whole, some 51% of EU Member state aid still goes to 
the manufacturing sector, suggesting that states themselves are unwilling to completely 
relinquish more vertically oriented interventionist traditions (ibid: 13). Presumably one 
can classify the structural and cohesion funds in a similar category. 
The EU’s most recent attempt at promoting economic competitiveness—the so-
called “Lisbon Agenda”—places a strong emphasis on horizontal measures and the 
promotion of broadly-based EU and national-level research and development goals. In 
particular, as noted also in the EU’s various State Aid Scoreboards (see e.g. European 
Commission, 2004b, 2004c), the Lisbon Agenda explicitly represents a formal attempt to 
broaden the scope of state intervention by recommending states shift “public expenditure 
towards growth-enhancing investment in physical and human capital and knowledge 
subject to overall budget constraints” (European Commission, 2004c: 21). 
The requirements of EU membership comprise an important set of constraints on 
New Member states. EU competition policy in particular imposes specific guidelines on 
state intervention. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the big question is to 
what degree such policies are likely to assist them in their pursuit of further economic 
development and restructuring, and to what degree previous policy strategies may have 
created more favorable conditions for economic development and restructuring. As noted 
above, prior to the formal conclusion of the Enlargement, the Central and East European 
countries pursued a wide range of economic development and restructuring policies. In 
the course of the negotiations on EU accession, many of these policies were found to be 
incompatible with the EU’s “acquis communautaires”. Those countries that pursued 
incompatible policies were required to change those policies as a part of the formal 
bargain of EU membership.  
                                                 
63 While there are general limitations on the so-called “intensity” of aid—i.e. the total amount of a benefit 
that individual recipients are eligible to receive relative to the investment made (e.g. tax exemptions can 
only refund up to approximately 65% of the original investment)—there are no real limitations on which 
firms can receive aid. 
  25Whether these policy changes were in the interest of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe is in part a matter of ideological perspective, in part a matter of 
intellectual and academic debate. Saddled with the legacy of strong state involvement in 
the economy through the former system of centralized planning, state ownership and 
over-investment in heavy industry, these states were confronted with considerable burden 
of economic adjustment. The move to the market economy has included the liberalization 
of market relations and abandoning much of heavy industry. Large state firms have in 
part been privatized and subjected to the constraints of exchange under the free market. 
However, there have been problems with the privatization of large state firms and special 
measures have frequently been necessary to encourage foreign investment and promote 
industrial restructuring, or to protect employment. A number of economic sectors have 
been particularly hard hit by the constraints of market adjustment and pose particular 
problems for competitiveness and the use of state aid. The steel sector has been 
problematic in several countries (in particular Poland and the Czech Republic), while the 
transportation sector (in particular the railways), energy and telecommunications, 
banking and the pharmaceutical sectors have posed significant problems for the majority 
of accession countries.
64
  Whether “horizontal” measures are well suited to solving the economic 
development and restructuring problems of the Central and East European countries, or 
whether more “vertical” or “sector-oriented” policy approaches are necessary in order to 
achieve improvements in economic competitiveness should perhaps be at the core of 
debates in the New Europe. The EU’s State Aid Scoreboard provides an interesting 
perspective on potential future policy divergence across the more and less developed 
economies of Europe. A small group of countries stand out as having made the smallest 
transition toward “horizontal” state aid initiatives over the period from 1998-2002 (See 
Figure I). The four countries with the highest share of non-horizontal state aid are 
Portugal, Ireland, Spain and France—ranging from some 26-58%. In contrast, at least 
eight EU Member states distribute more than 90% of state aid to so-called “horizontal” 
state aid measures, while 2 further states (Sweden and the UK) distribute significantly 
large shares of horizontal state aid. Only two of the more advanced EU member states—
France and Germany—still distribute significantly large shares of aid through non-
horizontal measures. While Greece appears to be an outlier and distributes surprisingly 
few resources through vertical measures, 74% of Greek state aid is in fact for regional 




[Figure I about here: Share of State Aid Spent on Horizontal Objectives, 1998-2002] 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe there is a far greater emphasis on vertical measures 
of state aid. In Hungary for example—as already suggested in the above discussion of 
fiscal supports—horizontal measures accounted for only 8.2% and 9.3% of state aids 
                                                 
64 See e.g. Burson-Marsteller (2004). 
65 Luxembourg is next in line with 61% of state aid going to regional development, then Belgium with 
52%. (ibid: 20). 
  26(excluding non-industrial aid) in 1999 and 2000 respectively.
66 Thus the vast majority of 
state aids in Hungary are in fact spent on vertical measures. The predominant share of 
state aid (excluding railway expenditure) falls in the category of investment promotion 
and tax incentives: 290.6 million Euros in 1999 and 371.3 million Euros in 2000. 
Moreover, as suggested above, there has been an increasing dependence on support 
derived from tax benefits and a parallel move away from direct grants of aid in Hungary 
over the period 1996-2000. Thus actual state expenditures on state aid are quite small, 
though the potential losses to state revenues may be more significant (this last point is 
discussed in greater detail below). 
  The autumn 2004 update of the State Aid Scoreboard includes data on state aid 
expenditure in Central and Eastern Europe over the period 2000-2003. According to this 
report, the findings for Hungary are generally consistent with findings for the broad range 
of Central and East European countries. On average, the New Member states spent some 
78% of state aids on vertical measures. Estonia is the only country to stand out as a 
significant outlier, with 100% of state aids spent on horizontal measures. As in the case 
of Greece, some of this aid is for regional development (33%, in fact the largest single 
category in Estonia). A significant share of state aid in Estonia is nonetheless spent on 
more typically horizontal measures. However, Estonia’s investment promotion strategy 
(described in more detail below) is not classified as “state aid”, and thus is not recorded 
in these statistics. Apart from Estonia, all of the Central and East European countries still 
have significant vertical state aid expenditures (European Commission, 2004c: 21). 
  The typical form of aid for individual countries is tax exemptions. Apart from 
Cyprus (80.9%) and Malta (36.6%), Hungary (61.5%), Latvia (57.1%), Poland (34.5%) 
and Slovakia (72.4%) provide the dominant share of state aid through tax exemptions. 
Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia, on the other hand, provide most of their state aid 
through direct grants. While the Czech Republic has provided most of its aid through 
guarantees, this is primarily explained by government bailouts in the Czech banking 
sector (European Commission, 2004c: 25). 
 
Of Square Pegs, Round Holes and Bargaining Hurdles  
To return to the previous distinction drawn above between economic growth and 
economic development, the central question to emerge from the above discussion is 
whether the EU policy framework is suitable to sustainable long-term economic 
development in Central and Eastern Europe. In the long run, this remains an open 
question. As noted above, most of the previous fiscal measures employed to promote 
investment in Hungary, for example, were classified as state aids during the accession 
negotiations. As a result of this clash of interests,
67 these measures have now been 
reworked, whittled down, eliminated in some cases, or modified and shifted over into 
regional measures that are more compatible with the EU policy framework. While on the 
one hand it is often seen as advantageous for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
                                                 
66 All data on Hungarian state aids is derived from the Annual Survey of Hungary on State Aid Falling 
Under Article 62 of the Europe Agreement 1996-2000, State Aid Monitoring Office (2002: 17, 35, 37). 
67 Batory, for example, emphasizes the fact that the EU and the Central and East European countries tended 
to view this issue very differently and had competing interests (2003: 15). 
  27to adopt EU policy approaches, this point needs to be more thoroughly debated, both in 
the context of competitiveness strategies and more generally. The following discussion 
analyzes the impact of EU membership and adopting the EU policy framework on the 
potential for Central and East European countries to pursue the objectives of economic 
growth and long-term, sustained economic development. 
While Hungary (Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and perhaps even Poland 
and Slovakia) may be well along the road to sustained economic recovery, many of the 
other countries in Central and Eastern Europe have been less fortunate in their attempts to 
attract foreign direct investment and/or have introduced less extensive investment 
promotion schemes. When FDI stocks are measured as a share of GDP, in order of 
magnitude Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia appear to be the winners 
in the process of attracting foreign investment (Hunya, 2004: 96). Measured in per capita 
terms, FDI stocks are greatest in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland 
(Sass does not provide data on Estonia) (Sass, 2003: 14). Investment promotion 
incentives appear to play a strong role in this process. As noted in the State Aid 
Scoreboard, over the period 2000-2003 86% of the total state aid in Central and Eastern 
Europe was spent by 3 countries; Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (European 
Commission, 2004c: 5). Likewise, as noted above and in order of magnitude, Slovakia 
(72.4%), Hungary (61.5%), Latvia (57.1%) and Poland (34.5%) granted the largest shares 
of state aid through tax exemptions (the category that covers investment promotion 
schemes qualifying as state aid under the EU regulatory framework). While Estonia 
likewise used investment promotion schemes to retain FDI, these were not classified as 
state aid and thus are not included in the State Aid Scoreboard. 
Thus many of the governments of Central and East European countries have been 
able to attract foreign investment by promising lucrative tax holidays and industrial 
enterprise zone arrangements, the use of which is gradually being restricted by the EU. 
Hungary was, by most accounts, the pioneer in this process and other countries such as 
the Czech Republic only began to follow suit much later (Sass, 2003: 16). While such 
arrangements have been controversial in the EU framework, they may have been crucial 
to the stabilization, emergence and profitability of several important sectors in 
Hungary—in particular the automotive and electrical engineering sectors—and in the 
broader range of Central and East European economies. And even though countries such 
as the Czech Republic, Poland or Slovakia have had a much smaller window of 
opportunity to pursue such schemes, they appear to have been able to use them to their 
advantage. 
  At least some elements of the evolving EU policy framework are likely to be 
marginally compatible with the interests of the more advanced Central and East European 
countries. The current shift in emphasis in Hungary from the simple attraction of foreign 
direct investment to more diverse forms of investment promotion—in particular the 
Smart Hungary program’s promotion of R&D activities or the promotion of Cooperation 
Research Centers—are programs broadly compatible with horizontal EU policy 
objectives. In this regard, Hungary is one of the few Central and East European countries 
(apart from Estonia and Slovenia) that has begun shifting more of its state aid to more 
horizontal measures (European Commission, 2004c: 21). However, there are likewise 
several potential problems with the EU policy framework.  
  28The Lisbon Agenda’s promotion of broad-based horizontal policy initiatives is 
primarily based on raising national-level expenditures and/or re-directing EU-level 
expenditures.
68 In this regard, it may be possible to think of the Lisbon Agenda as part of 
a longer term plan for promoting re-nationalization over redistribution in the EU policy-
making framework. Most of the Lisbon Agenda—perceived as the new potential engine 
of economic growth and development within the EU—is focused primarily on state-level 
expenditures. In order to promote the knowledge-based economy, states are urged to 
increase their overall R&D expenditures to 3% of GDP by 2010. 2/3rds of this 
expenditure is expected to come from the private sector.
69 Moreover, discussion of EU 
spending on the Lisbon Agenda is firmly rooted in the context of movement away from 
more vertical forms of state aid.
70 As such, this policy approach provides a framework for 
arguing against the logic of current forms of EU-level funding. Moreover, the levels of 
domestic R&D expenditure promoted by the EU are likely to be difficult for the Central 
and East European countries to achieve under current budgetary pressures. 
Whether or not the EU’s Regional Development Policy and state aid framework 
ultimately provides enough flexibility to continue promoting sufficient levels of 
investment is likewise questionable. In Hungary, the regional aid intensity map agreed 
with the European Commission allows for investment promotion incentives that refund 
between 35% and 50% of the original investment. Similar aid intensity levels apply for 
the other Central and East European countries.
71 However, the previous aid intensities 
granted to individual investing firms in the pre-accession phase often far exceeded these 
levels. Mutti and Grubert (2004) suggest in fact that multinational corporations producing 
for export rather than domestic markets from developing countries are more and more 
sensitive to host country taxation. To the extent this is true, the modification of 
investment promotion schemes used in Central and Eastern European countries may have 
a significant impact on FDI flows to the region. 
  Two further observations likewise serve to illustrate the problems that might arise 
from reliance on the EU’s Regional Development tool. For one, the allowable aid 
intensities for tax exemptions or grants are much lower in regions that have thus far 
attracted the highest levels of foreign direct investment. This may be a good thing insofar 
as this shifts investment and economic development to those regions that have thus far 
attracted less of it. But this may not augur well in conjunction with seemingly natural 
economic tendencies to “cluster” investment in regions with previously existing 
concentrations of economic activity (see for example Martin, 2003). Moreover, investors 
may be more likely to avoid less developed regions to the extent that infrastructure and 
                                                 
68 Rather than attempt to find new ways of shifting EU expenditure to such broad categories, the Council of 
Ministers’ response to the Lisbon Agenda instead recommended that the Commission focus its efforts on 
re-directing expenditures, and that states try to find the resources for such expenditures within existing 
budgetary limitations (“Final Report on the European Action for Growth”, Council of the European Union, 
November 26, 2003: 7-9). 
69 See for example “Investing in Research: An Action Plan for Europe”, COM(2003) 226 final/2. 
70 Ibid: 19. 
71 Most of Hungary qualifies for a maximum aid intensity of 50%, but the metropolitan area of Budapest 
only qualifies for an aid intensity of 35%, while the larger Pest County surrounding Budapest qualifies for 
40%. Two Western counties in Hungary qualify for 45%. For more information on individual country aid 
intensities, see the EU’s aid intensity maps for the New Member States at the website of the Directorate 
General for Competition: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/regional/2004/. 
  29human capital remains underdeveloped. In this regard, the lack of significant structural 
and cohesion funds to support the building of infrastructure and human capital potential 
in underdeveloped regions may further hamstring the success of regional development 
measures. 
For another, the EU’s Regional Development focuses on underdeveloped regions 
at the expense of more advanced regions. Although the Central and East European 
countries would presumably like to see investment rise in less developed regions, this 
focus may not be compatible with the desire to attract continued investment and long-
term, sustainable economic development in those areas that have already attracted 
significant amounts of FDI. In keeping again with the notion of clustering and the weak 
embeddedness of Central and East European firms, to some extent it may be important to 
continue to promote investment in these more developed regions as well.  
This is potentially most problematic where countries would like to continue to 
target specific industries (such as the automotive and electrical engineering sectors) or 
types of economic activity (such as R&D) in order to further refine the process of 
economic development. Thus, for example, Hungary’s attempts to focus on the 
sustainable and embedded economic development of the automotive and electrical 
engineering sectors could ultimately be one of the early casualties of future sustainable 
economic development strategies.
72 Despite the fact that the Lisbon Agenda, for example, 
promotes the use of “private sector” resources, capital scarcity and the difficulties of CEE 
domestic firms in raising capital expenditures and resources greatly limits this potential. 
In this regard, CEE governments find themselves compelled to fill the gap between the 
lack of private sector resources and their development interests, but likewise find 
themselves constrained by the combination of EU restrictions on aid intensity, on the use 
of state aids and the limitations of CEE government budgets. 
As noted above, the remaining Central and East European states—Latvia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania—have had virtually no opportunity to introduce 
significant investment promotion mechanisms. Thus far, these countries have been far 
less successful at attracting significant amounts of FDI. While this is true for many 
reasons, in particular due to their inability to introduce successful market reforms and 
promote political stability, the slow process of reform has produced a lag that may be 
more difficult to overcome once inside the EU. As EU members, these countries may 
have a difficult time initiating similar investment promotion schemes and attracting 
comparable amounts of FDI. In this regard, all of the above observations raises 
significant questions about the ability of Central and East European states to integrate 
seamlessly into the EU policy framework. 
In important respects, the central question being raised is whose interests are 
served by the adoption of EU policy and any resulting “leveling of the playing field”. 
Quite apart from considerations of optimal policy measures, there are clear economic and 
political interests in Western Europe that favor horizontal rather than vertical policy 
measures. As Seabright (1998) has pointed out, the EU and EU firms have been likely to 
                                                 
72 One response to this in Hungary may be to fund such projects from national level expenditure, but at 
relatively low levels so that these expenditures stay below EU state aid reporting requirements (Interview 
with Magdolna Sass, March 24
th, 2005).  
  30attempt to use insistence on the minimization of states aids in Central and Eastern Europe 
as a tool to reduce competitive pressures. In fact, several EU sectoral producer 
organizations lobbied the EU in order to ensure that basic competition concerns were 
resolved prior to the completion of the enlargement. Quite early on in the transition 
process, Eurofer repeatedly made clear to the European Commission that steel production 
in Central and Eastern Europe benefited from state subsidies and encouraged the 
Commission to assist in restricting their use.
73 The pharmaceuticals and the chemical 
industry produced one or more position papers outlining competitive concerns. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, the primary concern was the protection of intellectual property 
rights (EFPIA, 2000, 2003), while in the chemical sector the principal concern was state 
ownership and state subsidies (CEFIC, 1998). The general aim of “leveling the playing 
field” is now being taken up in the context of debates over corporate tax rates and EU 
funding. 
The analysis presented above provides strong support for an interpretation of 
competing interests in the New Europe in the context of the literature on state-led 
development. Government efforts in Hungary—and presumably in other states—follow a 
consistent logic of promoting economic development. Projects such as the Szechenyi Plan 
and the National Development Plan reflect concerted attempts by Hungarian 
governments to define continued national strategies of economic development and to 
target specific industries and economic activities. Moreover, such strategies build upon 
industrial development strategies whose origins, as noted above, in fact predate the 
enlargement. In the long term, given that both the former EU cohesion countries and the 
broad range of New Member states are prone to utilizing more vertically-oriented forms 
of state aid, interests in state intervention are likely to continue to diverge from those of 
the more advanced states for some time to come. In addition, since integrating the Central 
and East European countries into the EU context greatly increases the number of less 
developed countries likely to favor such policies, this divide will likely be reinforced.  
At the same time, it would be a mistake not to mention some of the potentially 
negative features of these development strategies. A number of potential criticisms can be 
levied at such policies. For one, the crafting of investment promotion schemes varies 
considerably across countries. Variation in their form and shape may provide insight into 
their advantages and disadvantages. In the Hungarian context, while the investment 
promotion incentives were strongly geared toward attracting large initial investments, 
there were no strong incentives offered to encourage large firms to continue investing—
once firms made an initial investment they could benefit from the tax concession whether 
or not they undertook further investments. In this regard, Estonia’s strategy of 
encouraging continued investment provides a relevant comparison. Though Estonia’s 
overall rate of corporate taxation remains high in the CEEC context (currently 26% on 
the distribution of dividends), Estonia adopted a 0% corporate tax rate for re-invested 
profits. While this policy was criticized in the EU, it does not contravene existing EU 
policy and has not been declared incompatible with the EU acquis (Radaelli, 2001).
74  
                                                 
73 Interview conducted with Eurofer, March 27, 1996. See also Eurofer’s position paper on the Enlargement 
(http://www.eurofer.org/positionpaper/EUenlarge/enlargement.htm). 
74 Current Estonian corporate taxation only concerns the distribution of dividends to investors, gifts and 
non-business related expenses (see the web pages of the Estonian Ministry of Finance: 
  31There are likewise potentially very real tradeoffs between government subsidized 
investment promotion schemes and the ability of governments to fund other projects. The 
budget for social welfare expenditure in particular may have been constrained by such 
policies. Greskovits and Bohle (2003), note that Slovakia has progressively lowered its 
corporate tax rate from 40% to 29% in the year 2000, and from there to 19% in 2004.
75 
As these authors make clear, the Slovakian government estimated that the changes in 
2004 would lead to a drop in government revenues of some 480 million Euros. In the 
long run, these authors link the 2004 food riots in Eastern Slovakia to this event and 
parallel reductions in unemployment benefits (2003: 23-5).  
Other costs of investment promotion are far more difficult to calculate. On the one 
hand, tax exemptions for large investments do not represent explicit losses in government 
revenues. As such, they are not directly paid for out of the government budget. On the 
other hand, while tax exemptions do represent potential losses in terms of government 
revenues, two additional observations are required. First, without such tax exemptions, 
the rate of foreign investment in Hungary and other countries might not have been as 
high. In order to be able to calculate the loss in government revenues, this point must be 
considered. Second, attempting in particular to attract large investments may well have 
the impact of creating significant sunk costs which foreign investors are then unlikely to 
be willing to uproot once the tax incentive schemes have run their course. In this regard, 
the important number of large-scale investments made in the Hungarian economy may 
well provide a more solid tax base for the future, despite the potential for such firms to 
continue taking advantage of future tax schemes.
76
Two observations suggest that investment promotion schemes may have had 
significant payoffs for the average citizen in Central and Eastern Europe. For one, though 
the evolution of relative income inequality across Central and Eastern Europe is 
uneven,
77 Hungary and the Czech Republic in both 1989 and 2001 remain well below the 
average level of income inequality (measured on the basis of Gini coefficients) in the 
OECD in the mid-1990’s. Poland, Estonia and the other Central and East European 
countries (Slovakia was not included in this measure), however, had all risen above the 
OECD average by 2001 (UNECE, 2004b: 165-6).
78 For another, the evolution of real 
wages in Central and East European countries is generally favorable for countries that 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.fin.ee/index.php?id=3830). The tax rate on distributed corporate profits is 26%. However, 
Estonia also abolished its tax on reinvested corporate profits in January, 2000 (Hunya, 2004: 106). Finally, 
Estonia received a transition period that allows affiliates in Estonia to distribute profits to their parent 
companies at a 0% tax rate until December 31, 2008 (European Commission, 2002: 35). 
75 Income and value-added tax rates (VAT) were also adjusted to one single flat rate of 19%. While this 
represented an increase in the VAT, it represented a significant reduction of income taxes. In order to 
partially compensate for the related loss in government revenues, along with the rise in the VAT, excise 
duties and energy prices were raised (Greskovits and Bohle, 2003: 23-4). 
76 In this regard, the issue of “aid intensities” 
77 Hellman likewise pointed out a correlation between lower levels of income inequality in Central and 
Eastern Europe (despite overall rises in income inequality) in countries that had pursued more extensive 
reforms (1998: 224-5). 
78 A word of caution is necessary here. As both Hellman and the UNECE study point out, the former CIS 
states (apart from Belarus) all have much higher levels of income inequality. Only Estonia, the most 
“liberalized” of the Central and East European countries, begins to rise of the lower levels in the former 
CIS states (UNECE, 2004b: 166). 
  32have pursued investment promotion schemes. Only four of the Central and East European 
countries were able to obtain wage levels at or above their 1989 level by 2001; the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland (though Slovakia lags on this measure, the big 
changes in government policy with respect to investment promotion occur in 2000 and 
most importantly in 2004) (UNECE, 2004b: 167). Combined, these two measures suggest 
that governments were not only likely to secure future revenues, but citizens benefited 
from these policies as well. 
Another objection concerns the degree of tax competition that has resulted 
between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. While this may well be a very real 
problem, this approach may misconceive the real axis of competition over investment 
resources in Europe. To some extent, Central and East European countries are competing 
for investment with the more advanced European economies. While the Central and East 
European economies have very real advantages vis-à-vis investment locations such as 
Germany—a significant supply of skilled and comparatively cheap labor—they lack a 
number of other advantages present in the more advanced regions of Europe—highly 
developed infrastructure, a larger supply of highly skilled labor, long established centers 
of research, development and product innovation. As suggested by the data on FDI flows 
in Table III above, the advantages of Central and East European are not great enough to 
significantly reverse regional investment flows. 
Finally, the problem of capture deserves some attention. Clearly it is not always 
in the interest of the individual governments to subsidize firms. There were, however, 
significant differences in the strategies pursued by Hungary and some of the other 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary’s approach was strongly focused on 
moving firms out of the sphere of state ownership.
79 This strategy of large scale 
privatization was pursued earlier in Hungary than in the other Central and East European 
economies. Thus, as pointed out by Antalóczy and Sass, significant concessions granted 
to foreign investors first assisted the state in the process of privatization (including even 
monopoly control of some sectors and/or protected markets). Later, Hungarian FDI 
strategies focused on promoting continued investment in greenfield projects (Antalóczy 
and Sass, 2001: 44). This later strategy employed what I call “neutral (performance) 
criteria” and was typically not directed at individual firms. These criteria were neutral in 
that any firm was eligible to receive tax exemptions from the government and they were 
often “performance-based” in cases where export or output criteria were added to the 
criteria for receiving tax exemptions. 
In contrast, some countries held on to large state enterprises and provided direct 
subsidies for longer periods of time than were presumably advisable. Poland, for 
example, pursued a conscious strategy of “commercialization” of state-owned firms. 
While this strategy did not rule out the potential for future privatization, neither did it 
guarantee that all state-owned firms would ultimately be transferred over to private 
ownership or offered for sale to foreign investors (Kolodko and Nuti, 1997: 26). Thus, 
                                                 
79 Though rapid privatization to foreign owners was in part inspired by the Hungarian level of foreign debt 
in the early years of transition, Mihalyi likewise points to an added benefit of selling Hungarian firms to 
primarily foreign investors. This strategy also apparently facilitated avoiding accusations of corruption 
(2001: 63-66). 
  33many of the Central and East European countries were less successful at avoiding the cost 
of hanging on to large public sector firms.  
In Poland the slow restructuring of the steel sector, for example, cost the Polish 
government considerable sums of money and weighed heavily on the state budget. 
Polskie Huty Stali (PHS)—accounting for approximately 70% of polish steel 
production—was privatized in 2004. The agreement with LNM Holding, included 
payments of $850 million to cover PHS debts and $600 million in guaranteed 
investments.
80 Moreover, the privatization agreement was spurred forward by demands 
from the European Commission that the Polish government stop providing state aids to 
the steel sector. According to Protocol No. 8 of the Accession Treaty, Poland had already 
spent some 62.360 million PLN (approx. $15.6 million) in restructuring aid between 
1997 and 2001.
81 Moreover, this figure may well understate the amount of real indirect 
government subsidies provided to PHS. Most government subsidies to the Polish steel, 
coal-mining and railway sectors took the form of tax reductions and other debt write-offs. 
Moreover, record keeping on these subsidies often appears to conceal the major 
recipients (Sowa, 2003). Protocol No. 8 limited further restructuring expenditures to 
3.078 billion PLN (approx. $770 million USD) in 2002 and 2003, and no further aid was 
to be granted from that point on.
82
At the same time, though many see the impact of EU pressure as positive in this 
regard,
83 it is difficult to ignore the important role of Western interests in this case. In the 
late 1990’s, the Polish government gave in to EU attempts to limit production and reduce 
employment in the Polish steel sector thereby successfully dampening the impact of some 
of the more competitive Polish steel firms on the EU marketplace and labor structure. 
The polish government ultimately signed an agreement that traded EU funding for the 
restructuring the Polish steel industry in return for Polish government control over the 
allocation of production quotas to Polish steel producers (Keat, 2000). As Keat argues, 
this agreement failed to reward those firms in the Polish steel industry that had already 
privatized and invested in new technologies by reducing their ability to compete in the 
EU marketplace. Moreover, by artificially limiting future market shares, these production 
quotas presumably had a significant impact on the ability of the Polish government to 
later privatize the steel sector. 
On the other hand, despite Hungary’s greater degree of early privatization, it has 
still held on to state-owned firms that are a significant drain on the budget and a number 
of firms remain in state ownership.
84 One example, MALEV airlines—currently almost 
100% owned by the Hungarian government—has for many years been a loss-making 
state enterprise (though previously partially privatized and part-owned by Alitalia). 
China’s Hainan Airlines considered making a bid for Malev in the summer 2004, but the 
deal was later dropped. In early 2004, MALEV had an accumulated debt of 36.4 Billion 
                                                 
80 PAP News Wire (3/5/2004). 
81 Official Journal (9/23/2003: 948). 
82 Official Journal (9/23/2003: 948). A Polish government audit of the effects of state aid deemed that 9 out 
of 12 cases of aid to the Polish steel sector were “inefficient and ineffective” (Sowa, 2003: 28). 
83 Moravcsik and Vachudova, for example, refer to “blocked bailouts of uncompetitive firms” as one of the 
positive benefits of EU pressure (2003: 47). 
84 As noted at the outset of this paper, the APV Rt. still administrates some 99 or more state-owned firms. 
  34Forint (or about 181 million US Dollars) and was running a deficit in the first half of 
2004 of 3.9 billion Forint (about 19.5 million US Dollars).
85 Though most of the 
Hungarian electricity sector is now fully privatized, MVM, the Hungarian Power 
Companies Ltd., is a second example. Owner/operator of the national electricity 
transmission grid in Hungary, MVM continues to be almost 100% owned by the 
Hungarian state. According to MVM’s 2002 Annual Report (the last report available in 
2004), MVM reported a total loss of 30.784 billion Forint (approximately $112 million 
USD) for fiscal year 2002. 
The reintroduction of the holdings of the Hungarian National Development Bank 
(MFB)—along with the Hungarian Privatization and Holding Company (APV Rt.), one 
of the two agencies in Hungary responsible for managing the assets of state firms—back 
into the budget of the Hungarian national government in 2002 was in fact one of the 
principal factors explaining the significant rise in the government’s budget deficit to -
9.3% of GDP that year.
86 In addition, however, the rising government deficit was 
presumably also affected by the inability of the government to use privatization revenues 
from the APV Rt. after January 2003. These funds were previously used to pay down the 
government debt and were not subject to parliamentary approval. Since January 2003, 
however, this has been changed and privatization revenues can only be used for specific 
purposes subject to parliamentary approval.
87
   The above examples suggest—at least in the long term—that there may be few 
alternatives to the eventual privatization of state holdings in large firms. However, future 
privatization strategies are subject to the EU investment promotion criteria that limit the 
latitude of Central and East European governments to pursue these goals. Aid intensity 
levels and restrictions on state aid for the rescue and restructuring of firms are strictly 
circumscribed by EU regulations. On the other hand, the slow rate of privatization in 
some countries—in particular the Czech Republic—may ultimately have had a positive 
impact on overall rates of unemployment and may have mitigated some of the more 
dramatic impact of the transition process. In Poland too, fears of the social impact of 
closing some of the state-owned steel sector kept the government from pursuing this path. 
In this regard, the share of the actively employed labor force in Hungary is somewhat 
lower than that for Poland or the Czech Republic.
88
In the long run, the above observations may point to serious potential limitations 
to the EU decision- and policy-making framework. Structured at it is on the basis of 
states and intergovernmental bargaining—in particular where overall EU expenditure 
levels are concerned—the EU policy-making framework poses real barriers to the 
redistribution of resources across states. As noted at the outset, even the new 
                                                 
85 See for example: http://english.budapest.hu/engine.aspx?page=news&artname=20040916-cikk-malev, 
“MALEV Hopes to Break Even” (9/16/2004). 
86 I am in part indebted here to an observation from Kalman Dezseri. See also the IMF’s individual country 
annual “Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes”, in particular the May 2003 report on Hungary 
(http://www.imf.org,/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp). 
87 Ibid. However, since most Hungarian firms have already been privatized, there have been few revenues 
from privatization since about 1997. 
88 In 2002, the share of the actively employed labor force was 74%, while it was 87.8% in the Czech 
Republic and 85.8% in Poland. See the Economic Survey of Europe, (2004, No. 1: 193, Appendix Table 
B.5). I am indebted to Magdolna Sass for this observation. 
  35Constitutional Treaty preserves the unanimity principle, and thus the right of individual 
states to veto policies related both to total revenues (i.e. taxation policy) and to total EU 
spending (i.e. the EU’s multi-annual Framework Perspectives). 
With the older and larger EU Member states far more concerned about growth 
and employment on their own territories, they are likely to favor policies that benefit their 
own constituencies more so than those of other countries. Under such circumstances it is 
difficult to imagine strong support for a renewed redistributional agenda in the EU 
framework—at least one that favors the less developed economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe. In fact, if anything, the EU will likely move in the opposite direction. This is 
likely for at least two possible reasons. On the one hand, as net payers, the more 
advanced EU Member states gain very little direct benefit from the EU’s structural and 
cohesion funds. As policies such as the Lisbon Agenda promote policy objectives from 
which the more advanced EU Member states are likely to benefit, these states are likely 
to attempt to focus attention on these policy agendas, potentially at the expense of 
alternative policy agendas.  
And this may be all the more true as the EU potentially grows larger and larger. 
There are some 10-12 more states standing in the wings that are likely to pursue EU 
membership in the not too distant future.
89 Not the least among these, Turkey is 
scheduled to begin membership negotiations in October, 2005, and is a large state that 
could certainly rival the voting power of all the current large states. In this regard, the 
future potential expansion of the EU is likely to result in ever reduced emphasis on cross-
border redistributional funding. Gaining support for funding in Central and Eastern 
Europe has already proved complicated enough. The potential for extending such 
expenditures indefinitely to more and more states may ultimately drain the Old EU’s 
remaining tolerance for cross-border redistributional measures.
90 At the same time 
however, this fact is unlikely to dampen the interest of the less developed economies in 
attempting to promote such policies. 
 
Conclusion 
  A number of important conclusions can be drawn that address multiple areas in 
the study of European integration, comparative politics and international political 
economy. For one, a first set of conclusions relate to the theoretical literature on 
globalization and neo-liberal approaches to economic transition. First, Susan Strange 
(1992) once noted that globalization drives states to compete over scarce resources—in 
particular capital. Whether it is open borders or the level of economic development that 
drives states to compete in this way, one or both of these factors has had a significant 
impact on Central and Eastern Europe strategies of investment promotion. States went to 
considerable lengths to attract capital, even to the extent of fully subsidizing the cost of 
large investments over time. Second, the neo-liberal view that states simply need to open 
                                                 
89 Croatia was also scheduled to begin membership negotiations in March, 2005 and Turkey is scheduled to 
begin negotiations in October 2005. Additional states likely to pursue EU membership in the future include 
the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania and possibly some 
of the Southern Mediterranean states. 
90 I am indebted here to a conversation with Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. 
  36their borders to foreign capital in order to attract investment—while not necessarily 
rejected by the Central and East European experience—is not strongly supported by it 
either. As just noted, states went to considerable lengths to attract foreign capital to their 
territories. Even Hungary, which enjoyed a clear first-mover advantage
91 in the region—
presumably in part due to its early establishment of a stable legal framework for foreign 
investors—did not consider this sufficient and in fact ultimately went much further. 
Third, many have suggested that the insertion of the Central and East European 
countries into global production networks will provide the foundation for long-term 
sustainable economic growth.
92 The extensive privatization of the Central and East 
European economies may however prove problematic for at least two basic reasons. For 
one, as suggested above, extensive insertion into the global production networks of 
multinational firms may in fact impede the potential for sustainable, long-term economic 
development. This outcome can be explained on the basis of three factors. A high degree 
of insertion into global production networks; 1) may limit the relative autonomy of 
domestic firms foreign affiliates to develop independent strategies that promote greater 
embeddedness, 2) it may have the undesirable impact of crowding out domestic potential 
for the creation of technology and innovative capacity, and 3) it may make firms and 
countries more vulnerable to fluctuations in the international marketplace and the 
strategic considerations of multinational headquarters.  
For another, at least without more concerted efforts to refine and more deeply 
embed the existing structure of economic activity in Central and Eastern Europe, these 
strategies may result in some crowding out of the innovation potential of the region. The 
more severe implication is that such strategies will lead to path dependence. This analysis 
thus places the emphasis for future policy considerations on strategies that will counteract 
the above mentioned concerns. These observations are not intended as a suggestion that 
countries should resist the privatization of industry or large inflows of foreign capital. 
The Hungarian case seems to suggest it would be a mistake for countries should avoid 
FDI as a solution to promoting economic growth. This is certainly one but not the only 
important element in promoting the potential for longer-term economic development. 
  A second set of conclusions relates to the potential advantages of supranational 
vs. national-level decision-making. In fact, the supranational level of decision-making 
may well prove inferior to the national-level. Countries that are distinguished by 
significant differences in the level of economic development may have significant 
difficulties coordinating compatible policy goals. At least for the Central and East 
European countries, their relative room for maneuver has been considerably reduced by 
the advent of EU membership. The EU accession process has been used to limit and 
constrain the behavior of the Central and East European states in multiple ways. From 
restrictions on the use of tax holidays and state aids, to restrictions on monopoly 
concessions, the EU accession process has gradually circumscribed and limited the range 
of competitiveness and investment promotion strategies available to the Central and East 
European states. 
                                                 
91 Sass (2004). 
92 See for example Eichengreen and Kohl (1998). 
  37Despite the common assumption that the supranational or EU level of decision-
making is somehow superior where the Central and East European countries are 
concerned—presumably due to their Soviet legacy—it is too easily ignored or forgotten 
that at least some of the steps Hungary made in the direction of promoting greater 
economic competitiveness and investment were initiated even prior to the fall of the East 
Bloc.
93 The investment promotion strategies that emerged in later years built on the early 
experience of the mid to late 80’s. Moreover, while many tend to assume that the EU 
accession has improved the practice of economic management in Central and Eastern 
Europe, in the Hungarian case at least, EU membership has offered a framework in which 
Western Member states can better hope to control the fiscal and regulatory policies of the 
New Member states. Moreover, the ability to do this presumably has a profound impact 
on shifting the regional burden of economic integration and adjustment. 
  A third conclusion relates to a commonly made assumption that the drive for EU 
membership explains the potential economic success of many Central and East European 
countries. This paper in fact suggests the opposite. In this case, EU membership is a 
constraining variable that limits the potential range of strategic choices rather than one of 
the principal factors explaining the relative degree of economic success. As Mihályi 
notes, Western experts in fact strongly criticized the Hungarian strategy (2001: 64). In the 
context of developmental models of the state, this paper in fact provides strong support 
for state-led models of development and for the view that developmental approaches are 
likely to differ strongly across the more and less developed economies of Europe (and 
elsewhere). Moreover, this point has profound implications for the shape of future 
tensions in the EU decision-making process. 
A fourth conclusion relates to the debate over whether neofunctional or 
intergovernmental models are best suited to understanding what drives the process of 
European integration. From the above, interests appear to drive the behavior of states in 
the context of European integration. EU member states have used the accession process 
not only as a means of constraining the behavior of Central and East European states, but 
also as a means of increasing their grip on many of the EU’s distributional resources (see 
also Ellison, 2005). Thus, while the EU framework is one in which the Central and East 
European countries may hope to have some influence on the decision-making process and 
the legislative framework in the European Union, it is likewise a framework in which the 
EU can more successfully control the behavior of the Central and East European 
countries. 
This does not mean that the Central and East European states will receive no 
benefits from EU membership. They should ultimately be among the principal recipients 
of structural and cohesion funding for at least the next decade and perhaps longer. At the 
same time, one should not ignore competing pressures for the continued re-
nationalization of EU spending vs. strong Central and East European interests in 
redistribution. And while the Lisbon Agenda’s focus on the knowledge economy may 
potentially be beneficial to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe—in particular to 
                                                 
93 Mihályi, for example, places the seeds of the Hungarian approach to transition in the early 80’s and 
places the principal authorship of Hungarian strategies of industrial development with Hungarian thinkers. 
While two of the individuals he mentions are Hungarians living in the US and the UK, a good number of 
the individuals involved had remained in Hungary (2001: 64-5). 
  38those such as Hungary who are further along the path of economic restructuring and may 
realistically hope to benefit from such a focus—the Central and East European countries 
generally have limited resources to dedicate to such a program. Moreover, even in 
Hungary, a few big projects still remain (such as the railways, infrastructure more 
generally and the electric utilities) that are likely to require significant expenditures for 
some years to come. Thus the relative compatibility of interests in the New Europe seems 
open to debate. The economic policy interests of New and Old Member States in 
particular are likely to diverge in important ways. In this regard, distributional and 
resource struggles are destined to remain strongly intertwined in future debates and 
policy-making struggles in the New Europe.  
  At least potential weaknesses of this paper are worth addressing. This paper may 
over-emphasize the actual role of the investment promotion schemes pursued by different 
Central and East European countries. The counterfactual that such investment would not 
have flowed to Central and Eastern Europe without such investment incentives is hard to 
disprove. In response to this objection, the degree and shape of foreign investment might 
well have been very different. Though Hungary was prepared quite early to engage in 
significant privatizations and allow significant foreign investments, it still felt compelled 
(even without regional inter-state tax competition at this early stage) to offer significant 
incentives to investors. This single point remains difficult to explain without pointing to 
the importance of the role of government and strategies of the developmental state. 
  The second failing of this paper is the fact that—by emphasizing the case of 
Hungary—it selects on the dependent variable. While some analysis of other countries is 
provided above, ultimately more work needs to be done on the remaining Central and 
East European countries. As already suggested by the analysis above, there is a 
considerable amount of variation in the economic development strategies that the 
different countries of Central and Eastern Europe have pursued. The outcome of these 
strategies in terms of long-term sustainable economic development and its distributional 
impact on citizens is likewise quite varied. Some important elements of variation have 
not even been discussed—such as Slovenia’s resistance to foreign capital or Estonia’s 
more neo-liberal approach. Further exploring the depths of these differences, their 
outcomes and the factors that explain them should ultimately provide a richer 
understanding of the future developmental prospects of Central and East European states. 
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Table I: Proposed EU Expenditures on Structural and Cohesion Funds 2006-2013 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total Appropriations  120,688,000 133,560,000 138,700,000 143,140,000 146,670,000 150,200,000 154,315,000 158,450,000
Percent Increase    10.7% 3.8% 3.2% 2.5% 2.4% 2.7% 2.7%
Estimated Population  459,069,367 489,194,290 490,157,736 491,125,055 492,096,247 493,071,313 494,050,251 495,033,061
Per Capita Appropriations  0.26  0.27 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.30  0.31 0.32
Source: Own calculations based on Appropriations data from “Building Our Common Future” 










      Table II: Average Rates of Corporate Taxation in Europe 












EU15 29.4% 29.4% 30.1% 30.1% 
CEEC10  21.5% 18.9% 21.4% 20.5% 
EU27 25.9% 24.7% 28.3% 28.1% 
Sources: Based on own calculations from Eurostat website 
population data. Corporate taxation data was taken from the 2003 
Devereux, Griffith and Klemm dataset (for Old EU Member States), 
and from Ernst and Young (2003). Corporate tax rates for Germany 
were modified based on data from the German government’s 
information website (http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/-
business/taxes/german_tax_rates.html).Table III: Share of CEEC FDI Relative to FDI in the European Core 
                          1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria  6.2%                      16.5% 26.4% 43.5% 55.3% 72.5% 63.9% 65.5% 72.6% 59.8% 62.1%  
Belgium/Luxembourg  0.1%                  -0.1% 2.8%  0.6% 11.5% 0.2%  2.9% 9.2% 8.1% 6.9% 4.6% 1.0%
Denmark     0.5%         2.2%      6.9%    
Finland                          0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 0.9% 1.7% 1.5% 1.2% 3.5%
France  -0.3%                        0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 1.8% 2.3% 3.3% 3.0% 4.1%
Germany  0.1%                        0.3% 1.0% 2.3% 3.8% 5.0% 6.2% 7.6% 9.1% 11.5% 10.3%
Greece            98.5%  77.0%  47.1%
Ireland              
Italy  0.0%                        0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 1.1% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Netherlands  0.0%                        0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.6% 2.1% 4.1% 4.7% 5.6% 6.1%
Portugal         0.3%  0.4%  1.4%  2.8%  24.0%  13.5%
Spain  0.0%                        0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.5% 4.5% 3.2% 3.9% 1.3% 1.5% 1.4% 8.2%
Sweden    0.0%                      0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.9% 2.2% 2.9% 3.8%
UK  0.0%                      0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 1.7% 2.3% 1.8%  
              
Norway  0.0%                        0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4%
Switzerland          0.8%                1.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.9% 3.4%
              
Japan  0.0%                        0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
USA  0.0%                        0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9%
     Source: Calculated on the basis of data from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (2001). 
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 Table IV: Share of CEEC FDI Relative to FDI in the Old Cohesion Countries 
Source: Calculated on the basis of data from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (2001). 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria  192.0%                     376.4% 424.2% 909.3% 666.1% 785.3% 906.5% 909.0% 858.0% 954.0% 1016.5%
Belgium/Luxembourg  1.6%                    -1.0% 91.6% 2.9% 86.6% -0.8% 18.3% 20.2%  171.2% 24.1% 96.8% 26.3%
Denmark     4.3%     17.2%      84.6%     
Finland                          0.0% 0.0% 23.5% 23.2% 39.3% 36.0% 44.5% 208.9%
France  -1.8%  -0.1% 0.8%                  2.5% 4.3% 4.8% 10.8% 13.9% 16.5% 19.8% 37.1% 
Germany  0.6%                      1.5% 3.8% 9.4% 16.8% 23.1% 31.4% 41.6% 51.3% 67.6% 74.0% 
Greece           16031.6%  7653.0%  5168.8%
Ireland                
Italy  0.0% 0.0% 1.3%          2.5%  12.0%  12.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 
Netherlands  0.0%                      0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.2% 13.5% 15.8% 28.0% 31.6% 33.3% 37.4% 
Portugal         0.2%  0.2%  0.9%    2.1%  6.5% 5.2%
Spain  0.0% 0.4% 0.5%              1.3% 3.3% 7.9% 43.2% 4.8% 3.3% 5.5% 753.1% 60.5%
Sweden                        0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.7% 19.4% 21.6% 31.0% 38.1%
UK  0.0% 0.0% 0.4%                1.5% 1.3% 4.2% 3.9% 5.2% 13.2% 15.7% 15.0%   
                
Norway  0.0% 0.0% 0.4%            9.0%  17.2%  18.3% 15.9%  18.6% 23.1% 29.8% 
Switzerland             9.7%  12.3%  22.2%  19.0%  17.0% 27.3%  21.6%
                 
Japan  0.0%                   0.0% 0.0% 6.5% 7.4% 7.4% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
USA  0.0%                      0.8% 1.4% 2.5% 9.5% 13.1% 14.7% 14.5% 13.0% 10.8% 10.1% 9.6%
  192.0%                     376.4% 424.2% 909.3% 666.1% 785.3% 906.5% 909.0% 858.0% 954.0% 1016.5%
  
 
Figure I: Share of State Aid Spent on Horizontal Objectives, 1998-2002 
 
 
  Source: European Commission (2004b: 21). 
  48